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A RADICAL RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SELLER'S
DAMAGES: MICHIGAN RESULTS COMPARED

Robert]. Harris*

I. INTRODUCTION
HIS is the second in a series of articles concerned with the
measurement of expectation damages1 in contract cases where
the plaintiff is a "seller."2 In the first article3 my notions of how
damages should be measured in such cases were set forth. This
article restates those views4 and considers the results of relevant
Michigan Supreme Court decisions. Subsequent articles will compare my notions with the case law of California and New York,
and with the case law which has developed under the Uniform
Sales Act.
Rules of law treating the measure of expectation damages
must answer four questions: (I) what is to be valued; (2) what
technique of valuation should be used; (3) which party has the
burden of going forward to prove the value; (4) how should the
value, once ascertained, be taken into account.
Conventional judge-made and statutory law on expectation
damage measurement consists of three discrete bodies of authority:
(I) statements of the abstract guiding policies; (2) what can be
called "parochial damage formulae"; and (3) scattered rulings on
the burden of proof. The statements of abstract guiding policies,
recognized in Michigan as elsewhere, can be summarized thus:
(I) unless one of the following five policies would be thwarted,
plaintiff should recover a sum which, when added to the benefits

T

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. The author gratefully
acknowledges the very extensive help of Kenneth Graham of the California bar.
·
1 Expectation damages are damages whose prime function is to make plaintiff as
well off as if the contract had been fully performed.
2 "Seller" is used here to include anyone whose performance is more than or different
from payment of money. It includes sellers of realty, services and personalty, as well as
bailors and lessors. For the rationale of the definition, see text infra at 858.
3 Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of
Contract, 60 l\IICH. L. REv. 577 (1962).
4 Some changes have been made in the theory presented in the prior article, chiefly
regarding burden of proof and the lost volume problem. The present article, unlike
the prior one, is not confined to total breach cases.
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he already received under the contract, will give him an economic
status5 identical to the one he would have enjoyed had the contract been performed precisely as agreed; 6 (2) there is no recovery
for items of loss unforeseeable to defendant at the time of contracting;7 (3) there is no recovery for those consequences of breach
which plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable self-protective
care; 8 (4) all of plaintiff's gains causally related to the breach must
be taken into account in measuring damages, 9 whether or not
plaintiff was obligated by the mitigation notion to incur the risks
that were involved in achieving the particular gain; 10 (5) all items
not proved with sufficient certainty are to be ignored in damage
measurement; 11 (6) all of plaintiff's expenditures in reasonable
5 The general rule denies recovery for mental anguish. See Hall v. Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 325 Mich. 35, 37 N.W.2d 702 (1949); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; R.EsrATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341 (1932) [hereinafter cited
as R.EsrATEMENT]. There are rare exceptions. See Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84
N.W.2d 816 (1957); McConnell v. United States Express Co., 179 Mich. 522, 146 N.W.
428 (1914); Humphrey v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N.W. 447 (19ll).
6 See Balcom v. Tribbett, 197 Mich. 620, 627, 164 N.W. 261, 262 (1917); Fell v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 543, 64 N.W. 474 (1895); Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 458, 35
N.W. 70, 72 (1887). See also Harris, supra note 3, at 577 n.3.
7 This requirement is variously expressed as involving foreseeability, tacit assent to
liability by defendant, that the item of loss be the natural and probable consequence
of breach, that it arise directly from the breach. See, e.g., Huler v. Nasser, 322 Mich. 1,
8, 33 N.W.2d 637, 640 (1948) ("not damages within the contemplation of the parties');
Wetmore&: Wetmore v. Pattison, 45 Mich. 439, 441, 8 N.W. 67, 68 (1881) ("damages •••
such as flow directly from his own default'); Cuddy v. Major, 12 Mich. 368, 370 (1864)
("an intention on the part of the vendor to assume an enlarged engagement"); Clark
v. Moore, 3 Mich. 55, 60 (1853) ("not • . • the natural and proximate consequences
of the breach'). See also the extensive citation of Michigan cases in Frederick v. Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 342, 165 N.W. 810, 813 (1917). See generally 5 CORBIN § 1007;
McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 137-41 (1935) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; R.EsrATEMENT
§ 330.
s This is known as the "duty to mitigate damages" or the "doctrine of avoidable
consequences," and is recognized in Michigan. See Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255,
200 N.W. 252 (1924); Beebe v. Cullinane, 214 Mich. 37, 181 N.W. 1016 (1921); Savage
&: Farnum v. Drs. K. &: K.'s U.S. Medical &: Surgical Ass'n, 59 Mich. 400, 26 N.W. 652
(1886). See generally 5 CORBIN § 1039; McCORMICK §§ 33-42; R.EsrATEMENT § 336; Annot.,
81 A.L.R. 282 (1932). But see White &: Carter, Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] 2 Weekly L.R.
17 (H.L.), discussed in Goodhart, Measure of Damages When a Contract Is Repudiated,
78 L.Q. REV. 263 (1962).
9 See Harrington-Wiard v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911);
Milligan v. Sligh Furniture Co., 111 Mich. 629, 70 N.W. 133 (1897); Petrie v. Lane, 67
Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887). See also 5 CoRBIN § 1041; McCORMICK § 160.
10 There is no Michigan case on point. Apparently the only authority in the United
States for this proposition is Griflin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 297
Pac. 662 (1931). The commentators cited in note 8 supra are in accord. See also British
Westinghouse Elec. &: Mann Co. v. Underground Elec. Ry., [1912] A.C. 673 (dictum);
Cock.bum v. Trusts &: Guarantee Co., 55 Can. Sup. Ct. 264, 269-70, 37 D.L.R. 701, 704
(1917), affirming 38 Ont. L.R. 396, 33 D.L.R. 159 (App. Div. Sup. Ct. 1917).
11 See Stephany v. Hunt Bros. Co., 62 Cal. App. 638, 217 Pac. 797 (1923); Isbell
v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v.
Corbit, 127 Mich. 473, 86 N.W. 954 (1901); Stevens v. Yale, 113 Mich. 680, 72 N.W. 5
(1897); Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); 5 CORBIN § 1020;
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efforts to avoid the consequences of breach can be recovered,1 2
whether or not the effort ultimately proves successful.13
A typical "parochial damage formula" appears in section 64,
subsection 3, of the Uniform Sales Act: 14
"Section 64. Action for damages for non-acceptance of
goods. . . .
"(3) where there is an available market for the goods in
question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of special
circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount,
the difference between the contract price and the market or
current price at the time or times when the goods ought to
have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for acceptance,
then at the time of the refusal to accept."
Another typical one, used where plaintiff is a building contractor and defendant-owner committed a total breach, appears in
Restatement of Contracts, section 346(2)(a):
"the entire contract price and compensation for unavoidable
special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when
the contract was made, less installments already paid and the
cost of completion that the builder can reasonably save by
not completing the work. ..." 15
Yet another, this quoted from Corbin on Contracts, governs
cases in which plaintiff is an employee wrongfully discharged by
defendant-employer before plaintiff substantially completed the
service of a particular period for which a definite wage installment
was the agreed equivalent. The measure is "the total amount of
the unpaid wages that were promised to him for his service, less
McCORMICK §§ 25-32; REsTATEMENT § 331(1); Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1950); Annot.,
78 A.L.R. 858 (1932).
12 See Hartford City Paper Co. v. Enterprise Paper Co., 86 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa.
1949); National Commodity Corp. v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 45 Del. 169, 70 A.2d
28 (1949); Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 254 (1924); Federal Bond
&: Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); Piowaty v. Sheldon,
167 Mich. 218, 132 N.W. 517 (1911); Berquist v. N. J. Olsen Co., 165 Minn. 406, 206 N.W.
931 (1925); Lake County Pine Lumber Co. v. Underwood Lumber Co., 140 Ore. 19, 12
P.2d 324 (1932): 5 CORBIN § 1044; McCORMICK § 42; REsTATEMENT § 336(2); Annot., 84
A.L.R. I7l (1933).
13 There is no Michigan authority for this point. See Development Co. of America
v. King, 170 Fed. 923 (2d Cir. 1909); Baker v. Mode Millinery Co., 193 Ill. App. 507
(1915); Rench v. Hayes Equip. Mfg. Co., 134 Kan. 865, 8 P .2d 346 (1932); 5 CORBIN
§ 1044; REsTATEMENT § 336(2).
14 MrcH. CoMP. LAws § 440.64 (1948).
10 This formula is used in Michigan. See Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278
N.W. 805 (1938); Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 50 N.W. 857 (1891); Wells v. Board
of Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 267 (1889).
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the amount that he can earn by making reasonable effort to obtain
similar service under another employer."16
Each parochial damage formula is specifically tailored for a
single kind of breach (such as non-performance, rather than tardy
or defective performance), for a single kind of contract (such as
sale of goods, rather than bailment or sale of realty or sale of services), for acts by a certain party (such as plaintiff-seller, rather than
plaintiff-buyer). In theory, at least, there are as many of these
parochial rules as there are fact situations to be litigated.
The last of the three conventional bodies of doctrine concerns
burden of proof. The case law on this topic usually is too fragmentary to provide anything deserving the name "rules." Typically it consists of (I) scattered holdings devoid of generalization17
and (2) oscillating judicial endorsements of two overly broad and
inconsistent positions. One of these shibboleths is to the effect that
"plaintiff has the burden of proving his damages" 18-suggesting
that plaintiff always has the burden of proving all aspects of damage measurement, including the value of what he saved or should
have saved because of the breach. The other purported command
provides that "defendant, being the party at fault, has the burden
of proving mitigation-what plaintiff saved or should have saved
thanks to breach."19 Probably in all states, despite the presence of
one or both of these supposed rules in the judicial literature, there
are some situations in which defendant consistently has the burden
of proving what he saved or should have saved,20 and there are
16 5 CoRBIN § 1095, at 431. See also Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222
(1922); Gerardo v. Brush, 120 Mich. 405, 79 N.W. 646 (1899); Stearns v. Lake Shore
&: Mich. So. Ry., 112 Mich. 651, 71 N.W. 148 (1897).
17 See, e.g., Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich .. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941); McColl v.
Wardowski, 280 Mich. 374, 273 N.W. 736 (1937); International Textbook Co. v. Schulte,
151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W. 657
(1880); Annots., 17 A.L.R.2d 968 (1951), 134 A.L.R. 242 (1941). The problem is barely
mentioned in the Restatement, probably because it was not considered to be substantive.
But see R.EsrATEMENT § 333 (d) (defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff
made a losing contract in reliance damage cases).
18 See Shapiro v. Fyrac Mfg. Co., 264 Mich. 280, 249 N.W. 851 (1933); Mount Ida
School for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); Callender v. Myers
Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930). Cf. R.EsrATEMENT § 333(d).
19 See Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, 111 N.W. 343 (1907);
Carver v. School Dist., 113 Mich. 524, 71 N.W. 859 (1897); Farrell v. School Dist., 98
Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). See also R.EsrATEMENT § 331, comment c ("Doubts are
generally resolved against the party committing the breach of contract.').
20 See cases where plaintiff is a full-time employee wrongfully discharged before
the end of his term contract. E.g., Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91
N.W.2d 288 (1958); Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954);
Farrell v. School Dist., supra note 19. See also Annots., 41 A.L.R.2d 955 (1955); 134 A.L.R.
242 (1941).
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other situations in which this burden is routinely placed upon
plaintiff.21
Conventional doctrine does not address itself directly to the
choice among valuation techniques, although the various parochial damage formulae give some clues. Underlying this series of
articles is an assumption that the doctrine makes mor~ sense when
restated in valuation terms. These articles involve an effort to restate in such terms one sector of expectation damage law-the
part that governs cases in which plaintiff is a "seller."22
A. A Single General Rule
A single general rule can answer two of the four basic questions
in all expectation damage cases.23 The rule is: "Plaintiff should
recover (minuend minus subtrahend) plus incidental damages." 24
The "minuend" is always the value to plaintiff2 5 of the difference
21 See cases where plaintiff is a seller of staple goods. E.g., Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich.
191, 54 N.W. 694 (1893); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W. 657 (1880). See also
.Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941).
22 By and large the question of the date on which value should be measured will
not be treated. For discussion of this vexing question, see 5 CORBIN § 1005; McCORMICK
§ 48; REsrATEMENT § 338; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J.
443 (1908); Editorial, 66 CENT. L.J. 365, 383 (1908); Note, 37 MINN. L. R.Ev. 215 (1953);
Comment, 17 YALE L.J. 611 (1908); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 114 (1925).
23 The rule is thought to be useful whether plaintiff is the "seller" or not; whether
the subject matter of the contract is realty, personalty, services, or some combination;
whether the transfer of property is permanent (sale or exchange), or temporary (bailment or lease); whether the promises were aleatory or not; whether the breach was
"total" or "partial"; whether the defendant's default was non-performance, defective
performance, or tardy performance; whether the breach was anticipatory or not; whether
the contract was unilateral, bilateral, or a non-bargain agreement supported by some
substitute for consideration. (What did the medicine man say? " . . . will cure lumbago,
falling arches, colic and warts; grow hair; purify the blood; steady the nerves; and
bring the bloom of youth to your dear grandmother's withered cheek.')
24 "Minuend plus subtrahend" appears in parentheses to show that it is the arithmetic, not algebraic, sum of the parenthetical matter and incidental damages which
is recovered. If the minuend is $50, the subtrahend $75 and the incidental damages $5,
plaintiff recovers $5, not zero. His $5 recovery is really a reliance damage recovery; a
zero recovery would be called for were the goal to give plaintiff the equivalent of full
performance on both sides-the expectation remedy. This assumes that plaintiff's reliance
damage remedy can exceed what he could recover on an expectation damage theory.
The Michigan law is in accord. See Reynolds v. Levi, 122 Mich. 115, 80 N.W. 999 (1899);
cf. Feldman v. Wear-U-Well Shoe Co., 191 Mich. 73, 157 N.W. 395 (1916).
There is scattered authority in other states for the proposition that reliance damages
must be reduced by the sum plaintiff saved by not performing the balance of the
contract. Sec L. Albert &: Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949);
REsrATEMENT § 333(a); Annot., 17 .A..L.R.2d 1300 (1951). If "saved" means "expenses not
incurred" as well as "resale losses not sustained," in these other states the plaintiff can
never recover, as reliance damages, more than he could have recovered as expectation
damages. Thus, in such states plaintiff should recover the algebraic sum of the parenthetical matter and his incidental damages.
25 Value to the promiscc, not to the plaintiff, is relevant in cases where plaintiff
is an assignee. No Michigan case raises this point or the related problem that arises
if plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary.
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between what defendant promised to do and what he in fact
actually did in the way of performance. The "subtrahend" is always the value to plaintiff of being relieved by defendant's breach
from all or part26 of plaintiff's scheduled performance.27 "Incidental damages" are always the value to plaintiff of the expenses
and/or losses he reasonably incurred after notice of breach in his
attempts to mitigate damages.28
This single general rule answers the questions of what is to be
valued and how shall the value, once computed, be taken into
account. Its universality, of course, is possible only because it
ignores questions of valuation technique and burden of proof.
The answers it gives to the two other questions are identical to
those of the parochial formulae. If the parochial formulae are
stripped of their references to valuation technique, they all turn
out to be elliptical statements of this single general rule.
26 In a "total breach" case plaintiff is relieved of all his remaining scheduled or
promised performance. Of course, if plaintiff has fully performed, he is relieved of
nothing. Where the breach relieves plaintiff only of part of his remaining scheduled
or promised performance, courts often speak of the breach as partial or of the contract
as divisible.
27 No adjustment need be made, of course, if plaintiff fully performed his side of
the contract before defendant's breach. Or, if the contract did not contemplate any
return performance by plaintiff, and was enforceable because of some substitute for
present consideration, such as formalism, past consideration, or action in reliance. Or,
if the contract contemplated an aleatory return performance by plaintiff, and the
aleatory condition qualifying plaintiff's duty to perform was neither met nor excused.
But if a return performance by plaintiff was contemplated, and it was neither rendered
nor excused for non-fulfillment of an aleatory condition, in measuring expectation
damages account must be taken of plaintiff's saved performance.
If plaintiff is the promisee in a "unilateral contract"- one in which plaintiff does
not promise to perform, but his full performance is a condition qualifying defendant's
promise to perform-and has not fully performed at the time of defendant's breach,
plaintiff's saved performance should be taken into account in measuring expectation
damages. This is true because, although plaintiff's remaining performance was never
promised, he could not fulfill his expectations of receiving defendant's performance
without rendering all of his own.
In this fact situation there is often a question of whether any contract has been
formed. Compare RllsTATEMENT § 45, comment b (merely acting in justifiable reliance
on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for treating the offer as irrevocable), with Pastras v. Oberlin, 350 Mich. 183, 86 N.W.2d 264 (1957) (defendant•
owner-offeror can revoke non-exclusive realty listing arrangement prior to the time
that plaintiff-broker-offeree found a buyer even though plaintiff has incurred detriment
in justifiable reliance upon it). Assuming a unilateral contract to have been formed in
this fact situation, there may still be a question whether plaintiff should get reliance,
rather than expectation damages. See Savage 8e Farnum v. Drs. K. 8e K.'s U.S. Medical
8e Surgical Ass'n, 59 Mich. 400, 26 N.W. 652 (1886) (court assumed that reliance damages
are appropriate).
28 The term is conventionally used in this sense, but not defined in this manner.
E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-710: "Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller
include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in
stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's
breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from
the breach."
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B. Consistency With Conventional Parochial Rules
Parochial measurement formulae are almost always expressed
elliptically. For example, the Uniform Sales Act rule quoted earlier
says the measure of damages in a certain situation is "the difference between the contract price and the market or current price."
It does not state expressly that it really means "the unpaid balance
of the contract price," and not "the contract price."29 The omission has no significance in a case where none of the price has been
paid at the time of breach, but the omission becomes important
if defendant-buyer has prepaid all or part of the price. However,
in cases where the latter problem is presented courts universally
include in the formula an adjustment to reflect that part of the
price that was paid.30 The parochial formulae typically omit reference to items which, although deserving attention when they arise,
occur only infrequently. Thus the builder's formula, quoted earlier,31 makes no reference to the value of materials which the
builder has bought to perform the contract and which are still
on hand when breach stops further performance. However, when
such items are present in a builder case, they are taken into account, his recovery being reduced by the net resale value of such
materials. 32
The elliptical nature of these rules tends to conceal the fact
that they can all be framed into the same three-term formula-as
minuend, subtrahend, and incidental damages. Demonstration
with two familiar plaintiff-seller formulae will illustrate this.
In cases where plaintiff is a sawmill operator, or some other
non-employee seller of services, and defendant-buyer of services
repudiated the contract before plaintiff had finished his work,
courts often express the parochial formula as "lost profit plus costs
incurred." The notion of "lost profit" in this context really means
"contract price minus total costs," so the fuller expression would
20 The Uniform Commercial Code is more precise. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE
2-708: " •.• the difference between the market price ..• and the unpaid contract
price together with any incidental damages."
30 See, e.g., Bradford Novelty Co. v. Technomatic, Inc., 142 Conn. 166, 112 A.2d 214
(1955); Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959); Hamilton v. Stephens,
240 Mich. 228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927); Weils v. Board of Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W.
267 (1889); Sal's Furniture Co. v. Peterson, 86 R.I. 203, 133 A.2d 770 (1957).
31 REsrATEMENT § 346(2)(a): " •.• the entire contract price and compensation for
unavoidable special harm that the defendant had reason to foresee when the contract
was made, less installments already paid and the cost of completion that the builder
can reasonably save by not completing the work."
32 See Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338
(1937); Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916);
Weils v. Board of Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 267 (1889).
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be "(contract price minus total costs) plus costs incurred." Since
"total costs" are the sum of costs incurred and costs yet to be incurred at the time of breach, the item of "costs incurred" appears
twice in the formula if it is further amplified: "contract price
minus (costs incurred plus costs yet to be incurred) plus costs incurred." Algebraic cancellation permits a simpler statement: "contract price minus costs yet to be incurred." 33
But this version of "contract price minus costs yet to be incurred," while avoiding redundancy, is still elliptical. No court
using the formula would hesitate to add to plaintiff's recovery an
item unmentioned in the formula-plaintiff's "incidental expenses" incurred in post-breach efforts to mitigate damages.34 Nor
would such a court hesitate to reduce plaintiff's recovery to reflect
still other phenomena as yet unmentioned in the formula. If at
the time of notice of breach plaintiff has on hand either property
-0r the right to command services, and he acquired such property
or such right to services through expenditure which was included
in "costs incurred," the value to plaintiff of such left-over services
and property must be deducted from his recovery to avoid overcompensation.35
One fin<ll adjustment must be made, and is made by all courts
using this formula: plaintiff's recovery is reduced to the extent
that defendant has paid part of the contract price before trial. 36
Thus, fully stated, this formula is "contract price plus incidental expenses minus (costs yet to be incurred plus property on
hand plus services on hand) minus that part of the price that has
been paid." More succinctly it is "unpaid balance of the contract
price minus (costs yet to be incurred plus property on hand plus
services on hand) plus incidental expenses."
This formula is identical to the author's "(minuend minus subtrahend) plus incidental expenses." "Unpaid balance of the contract price" is the same as the author's "minuend"; "costs yet to
be incurred plus property on hand plus services on hand" is iden33 The use of the parochial formula often leads to the wasted motion of proof of
total costs and proof of costs incurred, rather than direct proof of costs yet to be incurred. However, plaintiff often wants proof of costs incurred in the record in case his
expectation damage fails, and he must fall back to another remedy based on these costs.
34 E.g., Shapiro v. Fyrac Mfg. Co., 264 Mich. 280, 249 N.W. 851 (1933); Piowaty v.
Sheldon, 167 Mich. 218, 132 N.W. 517 (1911); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36
N.W. 88 (1888).
35 See cases cited in note 32 supra. See also Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1397 (1927).
36 See Greenwood v. Davis, 106 Mich. 230, 64 N.W. 26 (1895); Atkinson v. Morse,
63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 232 (1883).
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tical to the author's "subtrahend"; and both rules allow recovery
of incidental expenses.37
Another familiar parochial rule is the "difference money"
formula used where plaintiff is a seller of goods or realty which
defendant-buyer refuses to accept: plaintiff recovers the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time
and place of promised delivery. 38 As indicated earlier, the term
"contract price" in this formula really means "unpaid balance of
the contract price." 39 And, although the rule is silent as to this,
plaintiff can recover his incidental damages as well as the recovery
expressly indicated. 40 Thus, with the gaps filled, the difference
money formula reads: ",unpaid balance of the contract price less
market price at the time and place of promised delivery plus incidental damages." This formula, now expressed in three terms, is
identical to the single general rule. "Unpaid balance of the contract price" is identical to "minuend"; "market price at the time
and place of promised delivery" is identical to "subtrahend"; both
formulae permit recovery of incidental damages.
These two parochial formulae, when amplified, differ in only
one respect-the way they value the subtrahend. The "lost profit"
rule values the subtrahend by reference to plaintiff's saved costs,
whereas the "difference money" rule values it by reference to the
price the saved property would command in the resale market41
at the time and place of breach. Both rules give identical answers
to the questions of what is to be valued, and, once valued, how it
should be taken into account.
The two illustrations may suffice to show that the single general rule is identical with all parochial measurement formulae
which are concerned with expectation damages. There are some
parochial formulae, however, which are concerned with measuring
37 For a full treatment of the various ways in which the builder's parochial rule
is stated, see Patterson, Builder's .Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 CoLuM.
L. REV. 1286 (1931). Cf. R:£s'I'ATEMENT § 333, comments a, c.
38 See Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Pandaleon v.
Bretl.er, 227 Mich. 297, 198 N.W. 953 (1924); Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich. 191, 54 N.W.
694 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889). See
generally Annots., 108 A.L.R. 1482 (1937); 44 A.L.R. 215 (1926).
39 See te.xt at note 29 supra.
40 See Piowaty v. Sheldon, 167 Mich. 218, 132 N.W. 517 (1911); Peters v. Cooper,
95 Mich. 191, 54 N.W. 694 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W.
864 (1889); Annot., 29 A.L.R. 61 (1924).
.
41 Although the rule docs not specify the "market" in question, it refers to the
market in which plaintiff-seller would resell. See Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136
Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904); Peters v. Cooper, supra note 40; Simons v. Ypsilanti
Paper Co., supra note 40. But cf. Balcom v. Tribbett, 197 Mich. 620, 164 N.W. 261 (1917).
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plaintiff's recovery under some other remedy, and these rules, of
course, cannot be stated in terms of minuend, subtrahend, and incidental damages. For example, in Michigan42 and many other
states,43 plaintiff cannot cover expectation damages where defendant, a vendor of land, is guilty of a "good faith" breach of his
promise to deliver marketable title to the land. Instead, if plaintiff seeks damages, he gets a smaller recovery. Parochial formulae
governing this situation are not equivalent to the single general
rule. Loose judicial language, referring to all remedies which result
in a judgment for a sum of money as "damages," sometimes blurs
the distinctions among these various contract remedies: the price,
expectation damages, reliance damages, money restitution, foreclosure and sale with deficiency judgment, statutory remedies,
seller's specific performance remedy, and the peculiar measure,
already described, used for vendor's "good faith" failure to produce marketable title. The single general rule is only the equivalent of those parochial rules which aim at giving expectation
damages.

II.

VALUING THE SUBTRAHEND: GENERAL

A. Scope of This Article
The single general rule leaves unanswered questions of valuation technique and burden of proof; other rules are needed to
handle them. These valuation and burden of proof rules necessarily must be numerous, albeit not as numerous as the parochial formulae they are designed to replace. For convenience,
attention in these articles is limited to the valuation and proof
burden problems of only one of the three terms-the subtrahend.
More accurately, this article should be entitled "Valuing the
Subtrahend in Michigan." 44 The present title was adopted to
delude some readers into thinking the article was going to prove
comprehensible. Actually, cases in which the subtrahend proves
hard to value are always cases in which plaintiff is a "seller"-one
whose performance is not merely payment of a sum of money.
Where plaintiff is merely to pay money, there is little difficulty
with the subtrahend; in those (plaintiff-buyer) cases it is normally
Hamburger v. Berman, 203 Mich. 78, 83-84, 168 N.W. 925, 926-27 (1918); Hammond
But cf. Way v. Root, 174 Mich. 418, 428-29, 140 N.W.
577, 580-81 (1913) (court refused to say if Hammond is still good law in Michigan).
43 5 CORBIN §§ 1097, 1098; McCORMICK§ 178; Annots., 68 A.L.R. 137 (1930); 48 A.L.R.
12 (1927).
44 Or, "So You're Going To Value a Michigan Subtrahend."
42

v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374 (1870).
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the minuend that proves sticky.45 To the extent that Michigan
plaintiff-seller cases have presented problems of minuend valuation, the problems are discussed, but for the most part the plaintiffseller cases prove troublesome only as regards the subtrahend.

B. Policies Governing Valuation of the Subtrahend
Earlier it was suggested that conventional doctrine does not
approach damage measurement in terms of valuation, and that
parochial rules give only fragmentary guidance when a choice of
valuation methods must be made. But the abstract policies which
guide damage measurement set the goals for choice of valuation
technique, if the implications of these policies are pursued. One
guiding principle of valuation is that, subject to one qualification,
the value sought is the value to plaintiff. This accords with the
idea that plaintiff should recover a sum which, when added to the
benefits he already received under the contract, will give him an
economic status identical to the one he would have enjoyed had
the contract been performed precisely as agreed.
The major qualification of this approach flows from the mitigation notion-that there is no recovery for those consequences
of breach which plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable selfprotective care. Thus, the value of the subtrahend can never be
lower than the value that would have been realized by a reasonable man in plaintiff's post-breach plight.
Since another of these abstract policies dictates that gains flowing from breach must be taken into account whether or not the
mitigation requirement obligated plaintiff to incur the risk or
hardship entailed in making such gains, the value of the subtrahend can sometimes exceed the value it would have had for a
reasonable man in plaintiff's post-breach predicament-in those
cases where plaintiff takes risks or incurs hardship not required
by the mitigation rule and thus enhances the value of the subtrahend. Putting together these notions, the value of the subtrahend
will always be the higher of these two figures: (1) value computed
by reference to what plaintiff actually did after breach; and (2)
value computed by reference to what a reasonable man would have
done in plaintiff's post-breach plight to satisfy mitigation requirements.
For example, if breach releases the time of plaintiff, a full-time
employee of defendant, that would have been devoted to defend45

It is rare that incidental damages are hard to value.
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ant's work, mitigation notions dictate that the value of the saved
time be no less than the price it would have brought had plaintiff
made reasonable efforts to find re-employment in the same general
line of work in the same general locale.46 However, if after breach
plaintiff actually finds re-employment in some other line of work
which is more hazardous, but more remunerative, his receipts
from that work fix the value of his saved time.47

C. Policies Governing Burden of Proof
The abstract policies governing all expectation damage measurement furnish no help in allocating the burden of proof. Nor
is there any other well-established body of doctrine concerned
with the burden of proving various aspects of the subtrahend.
Since choice of valuation technique is closely bound to burden of
proof, it seems necessary to set forth my own assumptions about
the policies to be consulted in allotting the burden before treating specific problems. The Michigan case law contains nothing
in the way of policy statements on this point except the familiar
idea that the burden should fall on the party who normally has
superior access to the evidence needed to carry it,48 but there is
no discussion of the impact on this idea of Michigan's later adoption of broad pre-trial discovery rules. 49 At least in cases where
the sum at stake justifies the time and expense of extensive discovery, the new procedure tends to equalize the parties' access to
evidence. Nor is there any discussion in the Michigan plaintiffseller cases of competing goals that bear on the question of who
should bear the risk of a directed verdict in a no-proof situation.
(1) It is better to give the burden to the party with superior
access to the evidence needed to sustain it.
(2) Where the issue is susceptible to a yes-or-no answer, 60 and
neither party can carry the burden, it is better to place the burden
46 See Wood v. Ravenscroft, 135 Iowa 346, 112 N.W. 640 (1907); Hussey v. Holloway,
217 Mass. 100, 104 N.E. 471 (1914); Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d
87 (1954); Gallina v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922); Farrell v. School Dist.,
98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893); Annots., 81 A.L.R. 282 (1932); 72 A.L.R. 1049 (1931);
28 A.L.R. 736 (1924).
47 See Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930), and
cases cited in note 10 supra.
48 E.g., Mount Ida School for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931);
International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908).
49 The Michigan cases stressing relative access to the evidence were decided in 1931
and 1908. Broad discovery rules were adopted in 1952 and 1958. See MICH. CT. R. 35.
See also Comment, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 417 (1962).
50 Such as the question: could plaintiff have handled another similar contract
simultaneously? Questions of dollar value are not susceptible to a yes-or-no answer.
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on the party who is maintaining the less likely state of facts, so
that the court's assumption about the facts will coincide with the
probable state of affairs.
(3) Where neither party can carry the burden, and the consequences of failing to carry it are less severe if it is placed on one of
them, it is better to place it on that party.
(4) Where neither party can carry the burden, it is better to
place it on plaintiff (with resulting undercompensation and splitting of the loss).
Some of these notions require amplification. Where the issue is
the existence or value of an item which is added to the subtrahend,
the consequences are more severe if plaintiff has the burden of
proof, where plaintiff has no other remedy than damages to vindicate his expectation interest. If plaintiff fails to carry the burden
on such an item, he is deprived of all expectation damages. It is
necessary to visit him with so Draconian a penalty in order to get
him to establish items which, once established, reduce his recovery.
On the other hand, if defendant has the burden of proving such
items, it suffices to value at zero such items as defendant fails to
establish, leaving the rest of the expectation damage issues unaffected. This analysis supports giving defendant the burden of
proving the existence and value of items which go to enhance the
subtrahend.
But if plaintiff has an alternative way to vindicate his expectation interest, such as a suit for the price or specific performance,
that interest is not as seriously harmed by plaintiff's being deprived
of expectation damages. Moreover, if defendant has the burden of
proof on some item of expectation damages which cannot be proved,
plaintiff will be tempted to elect his damage remedy in the hope
of being overcompensated when defendant fails to carry the burden. Thus, where plaintiff has an alternative remedy, the burden
should be cast on him.
Where at issue is an item which, when established, reduces
the subtrahend, defendant must be visited with a fairly severe
penalty to force him to prove an item which augments plaintiff's
recovery. This can be done only by valuing the subtrahend at
zero if defendant fails to prove that item. If plaintiff has the burden on such an item, it suffices to value it at zero if the burden is
not carried.
Where neither party can carry the burden if imposed, the
court's choice involves either too much or too little recovery for
plaintiff. "Too much" means that he recovers more than can be

862

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

justified in terms of all major relevant policy considerations; "too
little" means that he recovers less than he should get to take into
account all of these important policy factors. In the prior article I
argued for giving defendant the burden of proof because in close
cases this would enhance plaintiff's recovery, this being desirable
because contract damage measurement always tends to give plaintiff too little. 51 This allocation of the burden, I urged, would serve
to reverse this tendency, whereas the opposite allocation would aggravate it.
I envisioned this tendency to give too little as flowing from
three doctrines: the "certainty" requirement, the non-recovery
of expenses of litigation, and the notion that recovery is limited
to harm to plaintiff's economic interests.52 My (erroneous) tacit
assumption was that these three doctrines were arbitrary limitations, reflecting no valid social policy. Upon reflection, however,
I conclude that the doctrines do have a basis in social policy,°3 and
that a recovery reduced in order to reflect them is not too small,
but rather is of the correct size to reflect all related major social
policies.
Thus, allocation of the burden of proof forces a choice between giving too much and giving too little; it is not relevant to
argue, as I did earlier, that it is better to give the right amount
than too little. 54 Stressing only the evils of undercompensation (it
fails to deter breach adequately; 55 it fails to make promises sufficiently reliable; 56 it fails to satisfy the notion imbedded in the
mores that the breaching party should fulfill, by damages, if not
performance, the expectations of plaintiff57) is misleading; overcompensation has its complementary evils.
51 Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of
Contract, 60 MICH. L. REv. 577, 589-90 (1962).
52 Ibid.
53 The "certainty" requirement is an aspect of burden of proof allocation and reflects
all the policies that relate to that allocation. For a policy discussion of the non-recovery
of litigation expenses, see 5 CORBIN § 1037; McCORMICK § 71; Note, 21 VA. L. REv. 920
(1935); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940). For a policy discussion of non-recovery for
non-economic harms, see 5 CORBIN § 1076; McCORMICK § 145.
54 Harris, supra note 51, at 589-90.
55 See KEssLER &: SHARP, CASES ON CoNTRAcrs 555 (1953); Fuller &: Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936); Comment, 57 YALE
L.J. 1360, 1366 (1948).
56 See Fuller &: Perdue, supra note 55, at 72; Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 725 n.47 (1931).
57 I am somewhat puzzled to state the policy basis of the notion that plaintiff should
recover enough to fulfill the expectations defendant created. Perhaps the mores dictate
that fairness between plaintiff and defendant requires this measure, and the social policy
is the familiar one of adjudicating quarrels in the light of norms hallowed by custom.
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The imposition of overcompensatory liability is more likely
to dislocate or ruin an existing enterprise than the imposition of
compensatory liability. And the notion appears to be established
in the mores that the breaching party should not be required to
pay his victim a sum larger than that required to make the victim
whole; 58 overcompensation does violence to this concept of manta-man justice.
Sometimes fallacious arguments are put forward to show social
utility in awarding plaintiff more money than is necessary to restore him to the status he would have enjoyed but for breach. The
argument that plaintiff should be given enough money to punish
the morally delinquent defendant (even if this is more than needed
to compensate plaintiff)5° suffers from two flaws: first, contract
liability is by and large amoral, treating the innocent breacher in
the same way as the malicious one; 60 second, under modern forms
of business enterprise liability is usually vicarious, presenting the
likelihood that innocent principals will pay the judgment flowing
from a contract breach by their less innocent agent. The argument
that overcompensation has a salutary effect in making promises
more reliable in the future 61 probably overestimates the impact
on future commercial behavior of the isolated overcompensatory
case, which (even if counsel knew of it and the client's decisions
were all based on advice of counsel) could be nullified by the astute
drafting of later contracts.
If, as I now suspect, allocation of the burden requires a judicial
choice between giving plaintiff what, in the light of all major
policy considerations, is too much or too little money, the choice
Perhaps the judges sincerely believe that there arc mores which so dictate, albeit the
"mores" arc in fact nonexistent. Perhaps the judges, seeking a place to draw the line
between competing social goals of give-enough-to-deter-breach and don't-givc-so-much-youdetcr-contracting, found this line handy. See Fuller &: Perdue, supra note 55, at 57-66.
58 It is surprisingly hard to document this statement by quotations or citations.
American judges and text writers seem to assume a priori that ovcrcompensatory awards
for breach of contract are bad; they do not trouble themselves to identify the social
evils that might flow from such awards. The practical corollaries of this assumption
include the judicial refusal to honor agreements for the award of overcompensatory
("punitive") damages in the event of future breach; judicial refusal to permit recovery
of punitive damages for breach of contract even in those instances where the breach
was attended by patent moral culpability; and extreme judicial reluctance to permit
back-door recovery of punitive damages in the guise of compensation to redress plaintiff's interest in being free from "mental anguish."
rm See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894);
Rl:srATEMENT § 331, comment c; Editorial, 66 CENT. L.J. 365, 366 (1908).
60 Except insofar as doctrines of mistake and impossibility and judge or jury "fudging"
in the interpretive and fact-finding process enter the picture, liability is imposed without
regard to the moral nature of the breach.
61 Harris, supra note 51, at 589.
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should be made by reference to a minor social policy-one which
otherwise would not be consulted.
The "minor" policy in question is a social preference for preservation of existing enterprises from destruction or serious dislocation as the result of the imposition of civil liability. Undercompensation leaves part of the loss where it originally fell, on plaintiff's
enterprise, and shifts part of it to defendant's enterprise. Thus,
each enterprise need absorb and/or redistribute only part of the
loss. Presumably, there is less likelihood of ruin or dislocation
when two enterprises each bear part of a loss than when one enterprise bears all of it. Overcompensation not only shifts to defendant all of the loss plaintiff sustained, but sometimes results in
additional liability, as well. In some cases, at least, overcompensation achieves ruin of defendant's enterprise whereas undercompensation would not have visited ruin on either enterprise. 132
This social antipathy toward ruinous civil liability is probably
consulted in this context (where major social goals are at a standoff), even if it is not well enough established to be deemed determinative in other contexts where better-established policies are not
in equipoise. 63
These various notions regarding allocation of the burden often
pull in different directions in a given case. By and large, it would
seem wise to subordinate the notion of placing the burden on
the party with better access to the evidence to the other policies
where: (a) the issue is one which often cannot be proved by either
party, and (b) broad discovery rules tend to equalize accessibility
to evidence. And it would seem wise to treat the undercompensation policy as paramount where there is a conflict among the policies to be applied on an issue which often is not susceptible of
proof by either party, and the allocation of the burden on this
issue will have a major impact on the size of the award. Thus, on
many major issues the controlling consideration is the preference
for undercompensation, leading to the burden of proof being
placed on plaintiff.
However, to avoid unduly undercompensating plaintiff, courts
should temper the rigors of the burden allocated in this fashion by
fairly relaxed standards as to how "certain" evidence must be to
carry the burden effectively. 64 Some requirement of "certainty" or
<>2 Id. at 589 n.54.
63 E.g., id. at 590.
64 Cf. R.EsrATEMENT § 329, comment e: "The uncertainties of valuation are frequently
so great that all that can be hoped for is an honest and reasonably intelligent estimation,
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"sufficiency" must be imposed, or the burden becomes meaningless. But the requirement should be no more onerous than necessary to reduce the risks of substantial overcompensation.
Since 1895 the Michigan Supreme Court has handled the overcompensation-burden of proof problem in plaintiff-seller contract
cases as suggested here. It has generally given plaintiff the burden
on major issues, but eased his path by a fairly tolerant view as
regards the sufficiency of his evidence to carry the burden. Prior to
1895 the burden was imposed in the same way, but there were
wide swings of opinion concerning the amount of "certainty" that
plaintiff's evidence must demonstrate. Cases involving "lost profits"
created the battleground.
Prior to 1895 the history of the court's treatment of lost profits
divides into two epochs. The first, roughly from 1859 to 1882, was
dominated by the views of Justice Christiancy. Although he had
retired from the court prior to Hopkins v. Sanford 65 (1879), his
attitudes were reflected in that decision. The second period,
roughly from 1882 to 1895, was dominated by the attitudes of
Justice Cooley. Although he had left the court prior to Hutchinson
Mfg. Co. v. Pinch 66 (1892), his prior opinions left their mark on
that case.
Justice Christiancy had favored the recovery of lost profits in
tort suits67 and in contract actions where the plaintiff-seller sought
to use the formula "lost profits plus costs incurred." 68 He saw the
recovery of lost profits as desirable to achieve full compensation
of plaintiffs and to deter future breach. 69 Although he never
espoused allocating the burden of proof to defendant, he did favor
a vast relaxation of the notion of "certainty," preferring to run
the risk that plaintiff be overcompensated rather than the opposite.70
The measurement of an injury in money by a jury or by the trial court will not readily
be set aside in cases where the subject-matter is complex and exchange values are doubtful or difficult." See also Annot., 78 A.L.R. 858 (1932).
41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879).
91 Mich. 156, 51 N.W. 930 (1892).
67 See Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117 (1871); Alliscm v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542
(1863) (trespass).
os See Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872); Burrell v. New York &: Saginaw Solar
Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865) (opinion of Cooley, J.; Christiancy, J., concurring); Hosmer
v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 293 (1859). He conceded the validity of a relaxed "certainty" rule
in cases where plaintiff-buyer sought lost collateral profits. Edwards v. Sanborn, 6 Mich.
347 (1859).
69 See Hosmer v. 'Wilson, supra note 68, and the other cases cited in note 68 supra.
70 Ibid.
65

66
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After 188!71 Justice Cooley led a somewhat indiscriminate reaction against this tolerance of lost profit recovery. Perhaps his
motive lay in a fear that, in cases where liability is imposed without
fault, defendant might be saddled with ruinous liability to redress
plaintiff's broken expectations.72 In two kinds of cases there was
a real peril of this phenomenon: tort suits, and the contract suits
in which plaintiff-buyer sought the "collateral" profits on some
larger transaction which aborted upon defendant's breach. In the
cases of present concern to us-where the plaintiff-seller sought
lost "direct" profits-there was no peril of vast liability: the direct
profits can never exceed the contract price. Justice Cooley apparently failed to appreciate the distinction, however, and he
transformed the "foreseeability" and "certainty" requirements
into insuperable obstacles to lost profit recovery in all three types
of cases. 73
In Allis v. McLean, 74 in 1882, Justice Cooley's abhorrence of
lost profit recovery first reached a plaintiff-seller case. The court
held that the plaintiff sawmill operator could not recover lost
profits, nor could he recover the rental value of his mill while
it lay idle. Indeed, the court went on to say that, regardless of the
evidence presented, no sawmill operator could ever recover lost
profits, because profits were "proverbially uncertain" in that trade.
This blanket proscription of lost profit recovery by an entire industry was later extended to flour millers,75 the language in Allis
having suggested that "millers," rather than "sawmillers," were
covered.
But almost as soon as Allis was decided, the retreat from it
began. Throughout the period from 1882 to 1895, when only one
71 Until then Justice Cooley had acquiesced in cases where lost profits were recovered.
E.g., Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich.

239 (1872); Sisson v. Cleveland 8: T.R.R., 14 Mich. 489 (1866); Burrell v. New York 8:
Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865). Justice Christiancy had left the bench before
Justice Cooley's new attitude was expressed.
72 That he was upset at large recoveries when defendant was without fault is
suggested by his remarks in Talcott v. Crippen, 52 Mich 633, 635-36, 18 N.W. 392, 393
(1884), denying recovery for lost profits in a tort suit because they were unforeseeable,
See also Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374 (1870) (no expectation damages recoverable
for "good faith" breach of land contract by vendor). Cf. '\\Tetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich.
311 (1871) (measure for conversion where lumber has been made into hoops).
73 Talcott v. Crippen, supra note 72 (replevin for lost profits); Allis v. McLean, 48
Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882) (plaintiff-seller seeking direct profits); McKinnon .v.
McEwan, 48 Mich. 106, 11 N.W. 828 (1882); Friedland v. McNeil, 33 Mich. 40 (1875)
(plaintiff-buyer seeking lost collateral profits).
74 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882).
75 Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, 91 Mich. 156, 51 N.W. 930 (1892) (flour millers
cannot recover lost profits but can recover rental value of idle mill).
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miller was permitted to use a "lost profit" formula,7 6 plaintiffsellers from all other trades were allowed to use such a measure
without hindrance. 77 And during the thirteen years until Allis
was repudiated in Fell v. Newberry 78 in 1895, the court conducted
a step-by-step retreat in the cases involving millers. 79 By the time
of the Fell decision Justice Cooley was gone from the bench,
millers were out from under the cloud, and the "certainty" requirement in plaintiff-seller cases had taken its modern, relaxed form. 80
Apparently Allis was recognized as a mistake almost as soon as it
was decided, although an express distinction between contract
suits for "direct" profits (the plaintiff-seller cases), and contract
suits for "collateral" profits (the plaintiff-buyer cases) was not
uttered until in Fell. 81 Henceforth such lingering hostility to lost
profit recovery as survived Justice Cooley was confined to the tort
and collateral profit suits.82 In time, the relaxed "certainty" requirement spread to all contract actions. 83
76 E.g., Petric v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885) (sawmill's recovery of lost
profits reversed for exclusion of evidence that no profits were lost); Petrie v. Lane, 67
Mich. 454-, 35 N.W. 70 (1887) (directed verdict against sawmill seeking lost profits
affirmed); Maltby v. Plummer, 71 Mich. 578, 40 N.W. 3 (1888) (sawmill failed to prove
lost profits with certainty); Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, supra note 75 (flour millers
cannot recover lost profits). In Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888),
the trial judge directed verdict against the sawmill after plaintiff's opening statement,
and was reversed. But the court held only that the case should not be decided at that
stage; plaintiff had yet to submit his evidence to establish lost profits.
77 Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 232 (1883) (haulfr of timber); Rayburn
v. Comstock, 80 Mich. 448, 45 N.W. 378 (1890) (logger); Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral
Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319 (1891) (franchised distributor of bottled water);
Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 50 N.W. 857 (1891) (building contractor); Lee v. Briggs,
99 Mich. 487, 58 N.W. 477 (1894) (logger); Hitchcock v. Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich.
40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894) (organizer of fraternal lodges).
78 106 Mich. 542, 543-44, 64 N.W. 474, 474-75 (1895).
70 Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882) (no sawmill operator can recover
anything as plaintiff-seller regardless of his evidence); Petrie v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25
N.W. 504 (1885) (sawmill operator's recovery of lost profits reversed for uncertainty and
exclusion of evidence); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888) (trial judge
erred in directing verdict against sawmill operator after his opening statement seeking
lost profits); Maltby v. Plummer, 71 Mich. 578, 40 N.W. 3 (1888) (sawmill operator's lost
profits arc too speculative, but he can recover wages paid idle permanent employees);
Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v. Pinch, 91 Mich. 156, 51 N.W. 930 (1892) (flour miller's lost
profits too speculative, but he can recover rental value of idle mill, own lost time, and
wages paid permanent employees); Fell v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 64 N.W. 474 (1895)
(sawmill operator's recovery of lost profits permitted; court overruled Talcott case, which
quotes Allis, sub silentio overruling Allis).
80 E.g., Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162, 120 N.W. 584 (1909); Barrett v. Graud
Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896).
81 Fell v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 543, 64 N.W. 474 (1895) ('profits .•• made in the
general conduct of the business"). (Emphasis added.)
82 E.g., Truman v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 169 Mich. 153, 135 N.W. 89 (1912),
and Quay v. Duluth, So. Shore & Atl. Ry., 153 Mich. 567, 116 N.W. 1101 (1908) ("certainty"
defeats tort suit for lost profits).
83 E.g., Scrbinoff v. Dukas, 348 Mich. 69, 81 N.W.2d 236 (1957); United States Gypsum
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Apart from the woes of millers during the period 1882-1895,
the "certainty" requirement has proved troublesome to plaintiffsellers in only one other situation: where the quantity term of the
contract is not fixed numerically, but is defined in terms of the
buyer's requirements. If breach occurs before the buyer establishes
a pattern of annual or periodic requirements, and the contract is
devoid of a fixed minimum requirement or liquidated damages
clause, it may prove impossible to establish the quantity of goods
the buyer would have taken, and subtrahend valuation fails for
want of certainty (as does minuend valuation). In three cases the
Michigan Supreme Court has found such uncertainty fatal, 84 and
in three similar cases slightly better proof has satisfied the "certainty" requirement.85 In none of these cases, however, does the
"certainty" requirement appear to be a mask for judicial hostility
to any recovery of large lost profits, as it was in the Cooley era. Nor
has the "foreseeability" doctrine been used in that fashion in
plaintiff-seller cases (although it, too, was put to that use in other
kinds of cases in that era).
•
The laxity with which the court has viewed plaintiff's shaky
evidence in some of these cases deserves emphasis. Evidence
deemed sufficient to carry the burden of going forward has run
the gamut from conclusory statements by the plaintiff, 86 through
expert testimony, 87 to elaborate accounting exhibits conjured up
from esoteric costing methods.88 Many of the witnesses permitted
to express opinions were of questionable expertise89 and often the
Co. v. Zacks, 236 Mich. 698, 211 N.W. 22 (1926); Ludwigsen v. Larsen, 227 Mich. 528, 198
N.W. 900 (1924); Balcom v. Tribbett, 197 Mich. 620, 164 N.W. 261 (1917).
84 Hall v. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 325 Mich. 35, 37 N.W.2d 702 (1949) (salesman
suing supplier); Isbell v. Anderson Carriage Co., 170 Mich. 304, 136 N.W. 457 (1912)
(franchised electric car dealer suing his supplier); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Corbit, 127 Mich.
473, 86 N.W. 954 (1901) (manufacturet of grain drills suing his exclusive distributor).
85 Holton v. Monarch Motor Car Co., 202 Mich. 271, 168 N.W. 539 (1918); Hitchcock
v. Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894); Mueller v. Bethesda Mineral
Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319 (1891). See generally Annots., 89 A.L.R. 252 (1934);
52 A.L.R. 546 (1928); 32 A.L.R. 209 (1924).
86 See, e.g., Record, pp. 61, 75, 78, Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood
Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Record, p. 8, Loud v. Campbell, 26
Mich. 239 (1872). But see app. for Appellant, p. 4(a), Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99
N.W.2d 362 (1959).
87 See, e.g., Record, pp. 4-6, Hester v. Harley, 230 Mich. 432, 202 N.W. 966 (1925);
Record, pp. 90, 99, 103, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668
(1923); Record, pp. 59, 78-79, Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162, 120 N.W. 584 (1909).
ss See Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Record, p. 44, Moline
Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338 (1937); Record,
exhibit 45, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., supra note 87; Record, pp. 46-48, Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911).
so See Record, p. 49, Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941) (elderly
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alleged accounting figures turned out to be no more than pretentious guesses. 90
The extent of the imprecision which has been tolerated becomes even clearer upon examination of the way in which the
trier of facts has been permitted to manipulate the figures produced. In one instance a trial judge was permitted to pull a 650
dollar "fudge factor" out of the air to offset what he felt to be an
exaggeration in plaintiff's testimony.91 In another case the jury
was advised that, while they had no discretionary power to assess
damages, they were not bound by the cost figures introduced by
plaintiff. 92 In both cases there was no other evidence in the record
on the issue.
In a number of cases the problem has been by-passed by a
stipulation as to the amount of damages, 93 and in others plaintiff's
success can be attributed in part to the lack of vigor on the part of
defendant. In many instances defendant has offered no countervailing proof on the damage issue, 94 and the verbal attacks on
plaintiff's evidence often eschew specific criticism in favor of a
parade of tired epithets-"speculative," "uncertain," "conjectural."95 No doubt some of this apathy of defendants reflects a
fatalistic appreciation of the trial judge's reluctance to reach the
conclusion that a wrong should go without substantial remedy
because it has deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to measure
lawyer who had once attended engineering school but never worked in the business);
Record, pp. 59-60, Gulf Vegetable & Fruit Co. v. Lane, 258 Mich. 634, 242 N.W. 792
(1932) (employee of trade publication whose sole connection with the market was in
connection with the sale of the disputed goods).

oo See Record, pp. 75, 130-31, Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods.
Corp., 3ll Mich. 226, 18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 456-58, 35 N.W.
70, 71-72 (1887).
91 See Record, pp. 131-32, Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp.,
supra note 90.
02 See Record, p. 131, Federal Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192
N.W. 549 (1923). See also Record, p. 166, Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W.
254 (1924).
93 See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. Zacks, 236 Mich. 698, 211 N.W. 22 (1926).
94 See, e.g., Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich.
226, 18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Holton v. Monarch Motor Car Co., 202 Mich. 271, 168 N.W.
539 (1918); Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559
(19ll); Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich.
239 (1872). But see Record, p. 51, Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560
(1941); Record, pp. 94, 100, 11!1, Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 254
(1924); Record, pp. 159-60, 165, 185, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich.
95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923); Record, pp. 100, Ill, Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162, 120 N.W.
584 (1909).
95 See, e.g., Record, pp. 11, 60, Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190
Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916); Record, p. 25, Atkinson v. Morse, supra note 94.
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his loss with precision. 96 Thus there may be at work, in trial courts
at least, not only a preference for undercompensation rather than
overcompensation, but also a preference for overcompensation
rather than nominal damages.

D. Valuation Terminology
When a court concludes that plaintiff was permitted or required to abandon further efforts to complete and resell the performance still unrendered when notified of defendant's breach,
it should value the subtrahend by totalling the values of all the
individual components that would have gone into plaintiff's postbreach performance. This is "components" valuation of the subtrahend, or a "components approach." When a court concludes
that plaintiff was permitted or required to complete and resell
the performance still unrendered when notified of defendant's
breach, it should value the subtrahend by reference to the resale
value of that performance, viewing it as an entity. This is "entity"
valuation of the subtrahend, or an "entity approach." The judicial
decision as to whether plaintiff was permitted or required to take
one post-breach course rather than the other amounts to a choice
between "entity" and "components" valuation of the subtrahend.
The nature of this choice can be illustrated by the plight of
plaintiff in Leonard v. Beaudry,91 a sa\\TIIlill operator who contracted to cut defendant's lumber into boards. Performance of this
contract would have kept plaintiff's mill fully occupied during
that year's milling season. Defendant's repudiation came shortly
before plaintiff's performance was to begin. At that juncture plaintiff had a choice: to try to find other loggers to whom the mill's
services could be sold, or to close down the mill for the season.
The decision actually taken, to seek other customers, was a decision to resell the entity. In this instance the "entity" was the milling services of this mill for one season.
The resale efforts were largely unsuccessful, plaintiff being
unable to find any customers that late in the season except for
some with inferior logs. Since the compensation of the mill operator was geared to the number of board feet of lumber produced, inferior logs meant reduced revenue per hour of mill operation.
96 See language of trial judge in overruling objection to the introduction of estimates
in Record, p. 64, Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274
N.W. 338 (1937): "I would hate to say as a matter of law that because they cannot
show the exact number of hours or days they are not entitled to recover at all."
97 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888).
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The mill was operated part of the season with such timber, and
was idle for the rest of the season.
If a "components" approach to valuation were taken, the
plaintiff's subtrahend would be the total of the value of all the
components that would have been saved had the mill been shut
down upon notice of breach: saved overhead, saved wages for employees, etc. If an "entity" approach to valuation were taken, the
plaintiff's subtrahend would be the resale value of the mill's capacity for the season. If plaintiff's efforts to resell this mill were as
vigorous and astute as the mitigation rule requires, what plaintiff
actually grossed by the resale efforts in fact made would fix entity
value here. The rules that should govern the choice between "entity" and "components" valuation are discussed subsequently; the
present purpose is merely to illustrate the two terms.
In valuing either the entity or some single component, a
court sometimes faces a choice among valuation techniques. If
it is valuing a component which plaintiff had yet to acquire at
the time of being notified of breach, valuation by reference to
plaintiff and a reasonable man in plaintiff's plight leads to this
technique-the value of the component is the lower of these two
figures: (1) the lowest price at which plaintiff could have acquired
the component, using reasonable efforts to acquire it as cheaply
as possible, or (2) the price which plaintiff actually paid to acquire it, in the event that by abnormal effort or risk he succeeded
in acquiring it even more cheaply. This is "cost value," as that
term is here used.
A second technique is applicable to valuing some entities and
some components which are on hand at notice of breach. It fixes
value at the higher of two figures: (I) the highest price at which
plaintiff could sell the item, using reasonable efforts to obtain the
highest gross receipts, or (2) the gross receipts plaintiff actually
received for the item if, by abnormal effort or risk, he succeeded
in selling it at an even higher price. In determining the highest
price at which it could be sold under this technique, the court is
interested in the behavior of actual potential buyers, as their behavior is manifested in bidding on this item or in bidding on or
buying similar items at similar times and places. Under this technique no evidence of the behavior of a hypothetical willing buyer
is admissible. The technique is "actual resale value," as that term
is here used. It is the buyer, not the sale, which is actual. The
actual resale value of an item can be determined although in fact
plaintiff never resold the item prior to trial. Even if plaintiff resold
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the item prior to trial, its actual resale value may be higher than
the gross receipts plaintiff received from that sale.
The third technique can be called "hypothetical resale value."
It differs from actual resale value only in this respect: in determining the highest price at which plaintiff could sell the item,
using reasonable efforts to obtain the highest gross receipts, expert
evidence as to the conduct of a hypothetical willing buyer is admissible. Indeed, behind the fiction of this hypothetical purchaser
the court is getting expert valuation based on a composite of many
valuation techniques.
Only one Michigan plaintiff-seller case, subsequently discussed,98 uses any other valuation technique.

III.

THE "COMPONENTS" APPROACH

A. The Categories of Components Defined
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence and value of
some kinds of components; defendant has the burden of proving
the existence and value of others. Some kinds of components are
properly valued by one technique; others by different techniques.
Some explanation of the various categories of components is required at the outset.
For purposes of this article, components are sorted into five
categories. The first group, "saved overhead," includes all items
which would have been only partially consumed in plaintiff's
post-breach performance.99 Such items are included whether they
were "on hand" or "yet to be acquired" at the time plaintiff
learned of the breach. If plaintiff's factory would have been used
to perform the balance of his contract, but the factory would not,
of course, have been wholly consumed in that process, some part
of the value of that factory is an item of "saved overhead." Similarly, if plaintiff had a permanent labor force, and some, but not
98 See text at note 142 infra. While the minuend is sometimes valued by the profits
lost on a collateral transaction which aborted upon defendant's breach, the subtrahend
is never valued in this manner. Doctrines designed to restrict that valuation technique
are inappropriate in the process of subtrahend valuation. See text supra at 866.
99 Since the line between "overhead" and "non-overhead" items is somewhat arbitrary,
close questions can arise. Where plaintiff would have used six more screws to finish the
job, and screws are sold by the gross, did he save the non-overhead item called "six
screws" or the overhead item called "4% of a gross of screws"? Close questions have not
troubled the Michigan Supreme Court. If they arise they should be resolved by reference
to the policy underlying this category: it is a catchall for items so hard to value that
unusual tolerance is shown to the party seeking to approximate the value of the category.
For an argument that no overhead should be deducted, see Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv.
634 (1958).
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all, of its time would have gone into completing the contract, a
portion of its time is "saved overhead."
It is not essential that plaintiff use an asset simultaneously on
both defendant's contract and another contract to put the asset
into this category. If the asset would retain some economic value
for plaintiff at the end of plaintiff's scheduled performance for
defendant, the asset is an overhead item, and that portion of its
value which is allotted to the balance of plaintiff's contract is in
the category of "saved overhead."
The category of "saved overhead" is isolated from the others
because of the peculiar difficulties of valuation which all items in
this category share. Not only is some cost accounting required to
determine the percentage of each asset which should be allotted
to the balance of plaintiff's contract with defendant, but there is
grave difficulty in proving the cost value or actual resale value of
that fraction of the asset. In theory the court should seek the actual
resale value of each "on hand" saved overhead item, and the cost
value of each "yet to be acquired" saved overhead item. In practice it is necessary to lump together all "on hand" and "yet to be
acquired" items in this category and use ro~gh approximations of
the value of the entire category. From the remaining (non-overhead) items, a second category can then be isolated: "saved nonoverhead items yet to be acquired." 100 Items are yet to be acquired
if plaintiff, at the time of notice of breach, could not by feasible
means escape the cost of acquiring them. All items which the
plaintiff had neither acquired nor contracted to acquire fall into
this category. Also included are items which plaintiff had contracted to acquire but which he could avoid acquiring without
untoward consequence. Thus, if he could terminate his obligation
to his supplier without loss of good will or substantial damages,
the items he contracted to acquire should be classified in this
category. Similarly, if the item was acquired under an arrangement which permitted plaintiff to return it to the supplier and
recover back the price paid for it, the item should be placed in
this category.
The unifying characteristic of all items in this category is that
they are normally susceptible to item-by-item proof of value, and
the appropriate valuation technique normally is cost value. In
a single instance an item in this category should not be cost valued:
if after notice of breach plaintiff nonetheless is shown to have ac100

The atrocious label is my own and I am properly ashamed of it.
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quired the item and to have put it to a use which (a) would have
been impossible but for a breach, and (b) which gives it a value
to plaintiff greater than cost value. This exception reflects the
general policy of taking breach-caused gains into account in the
measurement of expectation damages.
All remaining items are both non-overhead and "on hand."
They should be valued by reference to the re-employment plaintiff does or should find for them. They are here divided into three
remaining categories, depending on whether they consist of services,
personalty, or realty. Services must be isolated because defendant
has the burden of proving their value, whereas plaintiff has the
burden of valuing realty and personalty, for reasons that will appear subsequently. Personalty and realty must be distinguished
because, with certain exceptions, actual resale value is appropriate
for the former, hypothetical resale value for the latter.
It may be well to stress here the fact that the last three categories consist of non-overhead "on hand" services, personalty, and
realty. If plaintiff's mm time would not be consumed entirely in
the performance of the post-breach phase of his contract with defendant, but would be distributed among the many contracts which
plaintiff is performing simultaneously, his saved time goes into
the first category, as saved overhead.101
Although no Michigan Supreme Court case has involved such
facts, it is possible to have saved non-overhead "on hand" services
which are not those of plaintiff himself, but of an employee or contractor whom he engaged to work exclusively on defendant's contract. If the mitigation notion requires or permits plaintiff to put
the employee or contractor to work on some other of plaintiff's
projects rather than to repudiate the arrangement for services,
the "on hand" saved non-overhead time of the employee or contractor must be valued. If the mitigation notion requires or permits plaintiff to repudiate his contract with this employee or contractor, the price plaintiff would have paid him had he worked
constitutes a non-overhead item "yet to be acquired," and the
amount in damages plaintiff pays the employee or contractor are
items of plaintiff's incidental damages.
All saved components of plaintiff's post-breach performance
should fit into one of these five categories: overhead items "yet
to be acquired"; (non-overhead) items "yet to be acquired"; (nonoverhead) "on hand" services; (non-overhead) "on hand" personalty; (non-overhead) "on hand" realty.
101

See discussion of the Callender case at note 121 infra. See also Note, supra note 99.
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B. Problems of Categorization in Michigan
Often there is no need to decide whether a particular component falls into one category or another because, for the particular
purpose at hand, both categories are treated identically. For example, it is unnecessary to determine whether property "on hand"
is realty or personalty for purposes of burden of proof; as will
appear, plaintiff has the burden of proving the value of items in
both categories. But the line between the two categories becomes
important when a dispute arises over valuation technique: realty
"on hand" normally is valued at hypothetical resale value, whereas
personalty "on hand" normally is valued at actual resale value.
The results reached in Michigan cases suggest that the court
has had an intuitive appreciation of the categories just described,
although it has rarely articulated the notions fully. The court has
called the "overhead" category by that name,1°2 although it has
never attempted to define the concept. However, the results
reached suggest (with one possible exception) that the court's
working concept of "overhead" is identical to that described in
this article. The single instance in which the court may have used
a different concept of "overhead" occurred in circumstances where
such categorization was of no significance.
In that case103 plaintiff trade journal sought damages from
defendant advertiser when the latter repudiated its advertising
contract in the middle of the one-year term during which defendant's ad was to appear weekly in plaintiff's journal. Both at the
trial and on appeal the courts used an "entity" approach, not a
"components" approach, to value the subtrahend, treating the
space which defendant's ad would have occupied as the saved
"entity." 104 But there was some cross-examination during the trial
directed to the components of plaintiff's performance that were
saved. Plaintiff's editor testified that plaintiff saved nothing because of the breach inasmuch as all of plaintiff's costs of publication were met by the revenue from the first sixty columns of ads
printed in the journal, and all revenue after that was sheer profit.
Apparently plaintiff had sixty columns of ads without including
defendant's. The witness concluded that the plaintiff's profit on
defendant's contract equalled the contract price.105 The trial judge
102 E.g., Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Federal Bond &:
Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); Detroit Fireproofing Tile
Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916).
'
103 Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 (1907).
104 Record, p. 59, Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., supra note 103.
10:; Id. p. 26.
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made a finding to this effect, which the Michigan Supreme Court
quoted with apparent approval,1° 6 although the finding apparently
had no effect on the ultimate decision of either court.
The finding that plaintiff saved no overhead in this situation
rests either on a tacit definition of overhead which differs from
that presented here or on a factual assumption not wholly articulate. Either the courts tacitly defined "overhead" to embrace only
items which plaintiff would not have acquired but for his contract
with defendant,101 or they assumed that plaintiff actually had some
items of saved overhead, but that these saved overhead items had
a zero value to plaintiff. The latter would be a proper finding if
plaintiff neither found nor should have found any feasible way to
re-employ his breach-released overhead items, all of which were
on hand at the time of breach. This may have been true in that
case and may have been the thought the witness was trying to express. If so, the case is consistent with the treatment of overhead in
this article. The other reading of the case-that "overhead" only
includes items that plaintiff would not have acquired but for the
plaintiff-defendant contracts-is inconsistent with the court's
treatment of the concept in later cases,1°8 and ignores some of what
plaintiff saved because of the breach.
The court's recognition of the distinction between non-overhead items "on hand" and non-overhead items "yet to be acquired"
was explicit in Raycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co.,100 and tacitly indicated in the court's consistent use of cost valuation as to the latter
items,110 and resale valuation of the former. 111 Recognition of the
distinction between realty and personalty "on hand" is similarly
apparent from the court's consistent use of hypothetical resale
value for the former, 112 and actual resale value for the latter.113
See Finding VIII, id. p. 49.
The witness's reference to the sixty columns of other ads suggests that he meant
that publishing defendant's ad would not require plaintiff to acquire additional overhead
items. The ultimate question, however, seems to be whether the breach either released
some of the time of "on hand" overhead items, or enabled plaintiff to avoid acquiring
"yet to be acquired" overhead items. The witness ignored the first of these possibilities.
10s See Federal Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923);
Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916).
100 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960).
110 See Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923);
Brucker v. Manistee & G.R.R.R., 166 Mich. 330, 130 N.W. 822 (1911); Mueller v. Bethesda
Mineral Spring Co., 88 Mich. 390, 50 N.W. 319 (1891).
111 See Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338
(1937); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Zacks, 236 Mich. 698, 211 N.W. 22 (1926); Wells v. Board of
Educ., 78 Mich. 260, 44 N.W. 267 (1889).
112 See Hamburger v. Berman, 203 Mich. 78, 168 N.W. 925 (1918); Frederick v.
Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 165 N.W. 810 (1917); Allen v. Mohn, 86 Mich. 238, 49 N.W.
626 (1891).
113 See Gulf Vegetable &: Fruit Co. v. Lane, 258 Mich. 634, 242 N.W. 792 (1932);
10s
101
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And the recognition of a distinction between services "on hand"
and all other types of components is clear from the consistent judicial approach of giving defendant the burden of proving the
farmer's value114 while giving plaintiff the burden of proving the
value of the latter.115
That these notions are not only inarticulate, but hazy, is suggested by the court's rare efforts to explain its choice between
valuation techniques or its choice as to which party should have the
burden of proof. Usually the outcome is announced without supporting rationale or citations,116 but when citations are furnished
or a rationale is offered, the rationale117 or citations118 are often
unconvincing. The superiority of the results reached to the rationale offered for them-familiar in all common-law experience,
but striking in this context-seems to suggest that the court relies
most frequently on a mixture of intuitive insight and the abstract
policies governing all expectation damage measurement, with
little resort to such intermediate generalizations as parochial formulae or the type of rules presented here.
In only three cases has the court been required to categorize
borderline items that did not clearly fit only one category. In the
Roycraft case,119 involving a choice between saved non-overhead
"realty on hand" and saved non-overhead items "yet to be acquired," the court properly chose the latter category. The case is
discussed later in this article. 120
In Callender v. Myers Regulator Co.,121 plaintiff had agreed to
Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich.
259, 200 N.W. 254 (1924); Pandaleon v. Brecker, 227 Mich. 297, 198 N.W. 953 (1924).
114 See Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958); Edgecomb
v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 Mich. 43,
56 N.W. 1053 (1893). Cf. Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343
(1907).
115 See Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959); Mount Ida School
for Girls v. Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); International Textbook Co. v.
Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W.
657 (1880).
110 See, e.g., Brucker v. Manistee & G.R.R.R., 166 Mich. 330, 130 N.W. 822 (1911);
Brighton v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 103 Mich. 420, 61 N.W. 550 (1894); Allen
v. Mohn, 86 Mich. 328, 49 N.W. 626 (1891); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W.
232 (1883); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872).
117 E.g., Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923);
Frederick v. Hillebrand, 199 Mich. 333, 165 N.W. 810 (1917); Burrell v. New York &
Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865).
118 E.g., Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Cp., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 (1907);
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Corbit, 127 Mich. 473, 86 N.W. 954 (1901); Burrell v. New York &
Saginaw Solar Salt Co., supra note 117.
110 Raycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960).
120 See text at note 137 infra.
121 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1175 (1926). Cf.
REsTATEMENT § 329, illustration 3.
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sell defendant-manufacturer's product and to maintain a Detroit
sales office for that purpose. Upon defendant's repudiation plaintiff took a new job paying 16,000 dollars per year. Neither party
offered evidence to show whether or not plaintiff could have
handled the new job and his contract with defendant simultaneously. Defendant claimed, with success at trial and on appeal,
that on such a record the court should assume the two jobs were
incompatible, that plaintiff saved 16,000 dollars per year by being
discharged of his obligation to use his time for defendant's purposes, and thus plaintiff should recover nothing (the minuend being less than 16,000 dollars). Plaintiff claimed that defendant had
the burden of proving the incompatibility of the two jobs, and
absent such proof plaintiff's saved "time" should be valued at
zero. In Michigan "saved overhead" must be proved by plaintiff,
non-overhead services "on hand" by defendant. Thus, it would
appear that the outcome should turn on whether the time plaintiff
would put on defendant's work was "overhead" or non-overhead
services "on hand." However, this categorization was easy: inasmuch as plaintiff claimed that he could perform both contracts
at once, he was taking the position that his time was an overhead
item--one not wholly consumed in performing the contract with
defendant. The court did not elaborate the reasons for its conclusion that defendant should prevail, but the result is wholly consistent with the notions expressed here.
In another case122 plaintiff was a partnership selling masonry
services. The partners did some of the work themselves and hired
employees to do other parts of the work. Defendant having repudiated the contract before the work was completed, it became important to know what part of the remaining work would have
been done by plaintiffs themselves, and what part by employees.
The employee portion would be valued at the saved cost of hiring
such employees-1.50 dollars per hour. But, thought the trial
court in charging the jury, the part that would have been done by
plaintiffs themselves should not be valued at cost to plaintiff, but
at the actual resale value of their saved "on hand" services. Having
charged the jury to measure damages thus (although the jury
had no way of knowing what proportion of the work would be
done by plaintiffs themselves or what the actual resale value of
their time was per hour), ana having seen the jury render a substantial verdict for plaintiff, the court then ordered remittitur.
122

Hamilton v. Stephens, 240 Mich. 228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927).
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It entered judgment for the reduced sum, the sum being derived
on the assumption that all the saved time should be valued at 1.50
dollars per hour. This judgment was affirmed.
The result was correct. Although the trial court never explained its rationale and the appellate court gave none, the result
can be defended in this manner: the actual resale value of plaintiff's own saved time was at least 1.50 dollars per hour; there was
at least one potential employer willing to pay plaintiff this much
for their services-the partnership itself; this appeared from the
fact that after breach the partnership continued to hire employees
at that rate, thus demonstrating that it considered the partners'
time at least that valuable.
Thus, the necessity to decide if the saved services were those of
the plaintiffs or those of yet to be hired employees vanished, and
the 1.50 dollars per hour figure was correct on either assumption.
C. Valuing Saved Overhead
Were there neither problems of proof nor of accounting, the
process of valuing plaintiff's saved overhead might ~xhibit the
following sequence: (I) listing of all non-overhead items that
would go into completion of plaintiff's performance, directly or
indirectly; (2) elimination by the court of those items on the list
that contribute only indirectly, that is, breach does not "release"
them for other profitable re-employment by plaintiff; 123 (3) elimination of those direct non-overhead items remaining which plaintiff after breach neither re-employed nor was obligated by the
mitigation notion to re-employ; (4) determination of the percentage of each of the remaining items on the list that should be allocated to the performance of the balance of plaintiff's contract
with defendant; (5) valuation of each of these remaining items at
cost of acquisition (if they were yet to be acquired at notice of
breach and never acquired afterw1rd), or by reference to the use
to which they were or should have been put (if they were on hand
at notice of breach or acquired after breach); (6) totalling the
values thus determined of the various saved overhead items to give
the value to plaintiff of total saved overhead.
The second and sixth of these steps present no insuperable
problems of marshalling proof, but the other four steps do. The
third and fifth steps in particular will usually prove impossible for
either party to establish with any certainty.
123 Examples are plaintiff's good will and his immunity from prosecution "purchased"
by paying various taxes and license fees. Arguably these are not "costs."
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The Michigan Supreme Court in effect has permitted the party
with the burden of proving saved overhead to carry that burden
by a simplified process of proof. In this simplified process "expert"
testimony is used to establish: (I) the share of plaintiff's enterprisewide overhead costs that should be allocated to this contract, and
(2) the percentage of this contract unperformed at the time of
notice of breach. By multiplying these figures together an estimate
of saved overhead is established.124
To arrive at the first figure witnesses have been permitted to
testify regarding the "average" ratio that obtains in contracts of
this sort between contract price and overhead costs.125 Thus, one
witness testified that on the average his overhead costs ran to
twelve percent of the contract price, and from this the inference
was drawn that the total overhead costs of performing this contract
would have been twelve percent of the contract price. 126
The percentage of the contract unperformed by plaintiff when
notified of defenq.ant' s breach has been established by proof of the
ratio of variable costs incurred to total variable costs. 127
Thus, in one case where the contract price was 14,315 dollars,
the percentage of work unperformed was 43.8 percent, and "we
usually figure 12 percent [of the contract price for total overhead
costs of the contract]," the court in effect multiplied together
(14,315 dollars) (12 percent) (43.8 percent) and arrived at saved
overhead.128 The same technique has met with apparent approval
in other cases also. 129 Indeed, there appears to be no case in which
defendant insisted on proof of saved overhead130 in which plaintiff
succeeded in carrying the burden131 in any other fashion.
124 See Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226,
18 N.W.2d 387 (1945); Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Federal
Bond &: Mortgage Co. v. Burstein, 222 Mich. 88, 192 N.W. 549 (1923); other cases cited
in notes 86-94 supra.
125 Ibid.
126 Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 174-76, 278 N.W. 805, 808-09 (1938).
121 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
120 See H. 0. Brackney &: Son v. Ryniewicz, 346 Mich. 404, 78 N.W.2d 127 (1956);
Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 18 N.W.2d
387 (1945). Only in the Nurmi case, supra note 126, did plaintiff attempt to prove the
percentage of performance incomplete at the time of breach. In the cases here cited
breach preceded performance.
130 In Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958), defendant acquiesced
in treating saved overhead at zero after cross-examination revealed it was at most a
trifling figure. In Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131
N.W. 559 (1911), defendant abandoned on appeal his earlier objection to plaintiff's
technique of asking an expert what profit plaintiff would have made on the contract.
In other cases defendant never objected to the fact that plaintiff wholly ignored saved
overhead. E.g., Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872).
131 Plaintiff failed to carry the burden in three cases, but in all of them he offered
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This simplified method of proof helps the party with the burden to carry it, but he carries it in a fashion which is very likely
to overestimate the value of saved overhead to plaintiff. Of the
six steps listed previously, the first is avoided completely. The
second is avoided, but in the process of avoiding it the court overestimates the value of saved overhead since "indirect" overhead
items are treated identically with "direct" items. 132 The third step
is avoided, but only by the (arbitrary) assumption that plaintiff
had no overhead items on hand at the time of notice of breach
and never acquired any of them subsequently. The fourth step
is simplified by using the ratio of variable costs yet to be incurred
to total variable costs as the percentage in question for every overhead item-an arbitrary assumption that may either overstate or
understate the value of saved overhead. The fifth step is simplified
by the assumption already noted: that all overhead items are yet
to be acquired and are never acquired post-breach. If plaintiff
remains in business after the breach, this assumption is obviously
false. Even if he does not remain in business, it is unlikely that
he had no overhead items "on hand" at notice of breach if defendant's contract was not the first contract ever performed by plaintiff. The simplification of this fifth step goes the farthest toward
overstatement of saved overhead, ignoring as it does the very likely
possibility that plaintiff cannot re-employ all breach-released
overhead, or that its re-employment is less valuable than its acquisition cost value. 133 The sixth step, of course, is avoided.
The writer has no basic quarrel with the simplified approach
to valuing saved overhead used in the Michigan cases. While perfect accuracy requires that overhead items on hand should be
valued according to the use to which they were or should have
been put after breach, the practical difficulties of mustering such
proof are so great that it is wise to settle for proof which is less
no proof of saved overhead, simplified or otherwise. See Mount Ida School for Girls v.
Rood, 253 Mich. 482, 235 N.W. 227 (1931); Detroit Fireproofing Tile Co. v. Vinton Co.,
190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916); International Te.xtbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich.
149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908).
132 The term "indirect overhead item," as used here, refers to one of plaintiff's
commodities which is no more ayailable for other use by plaintiff, after plaintiff has been
relieved of his obligation to complete performance for defendant, than it would have
been had plaintiff not been so relieved. The concept is not the same as any of the
of the various accountant's concepts that are labelled "indirect costs." I have found
no Michigan case in which a plaintiff attempted to exclude from his proof of saved
overhead "indirect overhead items," on the ground that such items are not capable
of being "saved." The court should accept such an argument, were it made.
133 See Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 634, 637 n.13 (1958).
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accurate, but more feasible to gather. Insisting on more theoretical
accuracy would only result in inability to prove saved overhead
at all; in that event the court would be compelled either to assume
that saved overhead had a zero value to plaintiff (if defendant was
given the burden of proving it), or to deprive plaintiff of expec~
tation damages (if plaintiff had the burden). Either assumption
would result in a judgment further distorted from reality than
the judgment rendered when saved overhead is proved in the
fashion now tolerated by the court.
The problems of cost accounting and proof are so great in
· regard to this item that little in the way of hard-and-fast valuation
rules seems desirable. Courts should, as the Michigan court does,
relax the "certainty" rule to make admissible such proof as is
both feasible to muster and reasonably geared to approximate
reality. Of course, where the sums at stake are larger, and it is
feasible for counsel to use more expert testimony based on more
extensive trial preparation, the standards should be higher.
D. Burden of Proving Saved Overhead
The Michigan Supreme Court gives the plaintiff the burden
of proving saved overhead.134 As indicated, it permits him some
leeway in carrying this burden, but the simplified method of proof
which it tolerates still resolves some important questions against
him. The plaintiff who succeeds in avoiding a directed verdict
against him by use of the simplified proof nonetheless is probably
undercompensated. The amount of undercompensation varies directly with the ratio of his overhead items to all items. If he is in
a trade in which overhead items figure prominently, he is grossly
undercompensated.
The only solution to this problem would be to permit plaintiff to establish prima facie his -saved overhead by the simplified
method, and then to try to reduce that figure by showing specific
overhead items (either on hand at breach or reasonably acquired
after breach) that would have gone into his post-breach performance and which plaintiff neither did re-employ nor should have
fully re-employed. Apparently no plaintiff has attempted such a
showing, perhaps because of its difficulty. But should the attempt
be made, the court would be well-advised to allow it.
Only two major alternatives to the current Michigan solution
suggest themselves, and both seem inferior to it. One would give
134 See cases cited in note 115 supra. See also Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., 250
Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930) (semble), discussed in the text at note 121 supra.
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defendant the burden of proving saved overhead, but permit him
to use the simplified method of proof. In cases where the simplified method could not be used (for example, where plaintiff
lacked sufficient experience to form an estimate of his average
ratio of overhead costs to gross receipts in contracts of this sort),
the result would err toward overcompensation, which is undesirable. Moreover, this solution would in all cases give the burden
to the party with inferior access to the evidence.
In the prior article135 I suggested the other alternative-giving
defendant the burden of proof without resort to the simplified
method of proof. I was led to this by a preference for overcompensation, rather than its converse, and by fears lest a plaintiff lose
his entire expectation damage remedy for lack of proof of some
trifling item of overhead. Now in the ranks of the friends of undercompensation, I see little value in this alternative. Moreover,
since counsel almost always prove saved overhead by this simplified route, in which there is little peril of some small item being
omitted (since the whole matter is handled much more crudely),
fears of plaintiff losing his whole case for uncertain proof of a
trifling item seem unrealistic. The existing Michigan solution
seems the best of the (admittedly poor) alternatives open to courts.
Perhaps it should be tempered in one small way: in the event
plaintiff does attempt to establish saved overhead item by item,
and he fails to include some fairly trifling items, at least if he had
no expectation remedy except for damages, his omissions should
be ignored, or adjusted by an arbitrary deduction of some sum
from his recovery, rather than necessitate the denial of all expectation damages. 136

E. Valuing Saved Non-Overhead Items "Yet To Be Acquired"
Normally such items should be valued by reference to their
cost value, i.e., the lower of two figures: what plaintiff actually
paid to acquire them, or the lowest price he would have paid had
he used reasonable efforts to acquire them as cheaply as possible.
The rare situation in which an item in this category is valued
136 Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach of
Contract, 60 MrcH. L. REv. 577 (1962).
136 By treating the contract as "divisible" and confining plaintiff to failure to carry
the burden as to that particular segment of the contract, a court can minimize the impact
of failing to carry the burden in some instances. For example, plaintiff can recover for
his pre-breach performance, although he fails to recover for the post-breach phase.
E.g., Davey v. Sanders, 253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); Reynolds v. Levi, 122 Mich.
115, 80 N.W. 999 (1899).
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above its cost to plaintiff has two characteristics: (a) after breach
plaintiff nonetheless acquires the item, and (b) plaintiff then puts
it to a use which (i) would have been impossible had plaintiff performed his contract with defendant, and (ii) gives the item a value
to plaintiff greater than the cost of acquisition. This exception
reflects the abstract guiding policy that breach-caused gains must
be taken into account in measuring expectation damages.
For example, assume plaintiff agreed to sell Blackacre to defendant for 30,000 dollars at a date one year after the date of
contract formation. At the time of contract formation plaintiff
did not own Blackacre, but had an option to buy it from its owner
for 25,000 dollars. On the date for closing with defendant the
hypothetical resale value of Blackacre is 32,000 dollars and defendant defaults. If plaintiff then fails to exercise his option, the
land should be valued at the cost of it which plaintiff avoided incurring-25 ,000 dollars. But if plaintiff upon defendant's breach
nonetheless exercises the option, the land should be valued at
32,000 dollars. In the latter event plaintiff's post-breach behavior
has enabled him to make a gain caused by breach, and this gain
must be taken into account.
A Michigan case presented the former situation, with plaintiff
failing to exercise the option upon defendant's breach. The court
properly valued the land by cost value.137 The case is significant
because the court rejected defendant's argument to the effect that
saved realty should always be valued at hypothetical resale value
whether "yet to be acquired" or "on hand" at the time of notice
of breach.138

F. Burden of Proving the Value of Saved Non-Overhead Items
"Yet To be Acquired"
Although no Michigan case clearly raises the question of burden of proof on items in this category, it is clear that courts and
counsel have universally assumed that plaintiff has the burden
of proof. 139 The one dictum in point is in agreement.14° This
appears wise, inasmuch as plaintiff has superior access to the evidence and undercompensation is preferable to its converse. The
sole disadvantage is the peril that in some case plaintiff will fail
Roycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W.2d 223 (1960).
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 21, Roycraft v. Northville-Six Mile Co., supra
note 137.
139 See Kolton v. Nassar, 358 Mich. 154, 99 N.W.2d 362 (1959).
140 Ibid.
137
138
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to prove a single item, or some trifling few items, and be visited
with the Draconian sanction of denial of all expectation damages
recovery. If this occurs in a case where plaintiff had no price
remedy or specific performance remedy available as an alternative
route to vindicate his expectation interest, the burden will have
worked injustice.
But the reported Michigan Supreme Court opinions fail to
reveal such an instance, perhaps because the trial judges have
turned a deaf ear to defendant's criticism of trifling omissions in
plaintiff's proof of this category of components.
If plaintiff attempts to establish the value of an item in this
category at cost value, and defendant wants it valued higher (on
the theory that plaintiff nonetheless acquired it after breach and
put it to a use impossible, but for breach, and more valuable to
plaintiff than its cost), defendant should have the burden of proving this state of facts. Since he is attempting to raise the value
of the subtrahend, less Draconian consequences attend defendant's
failure to carry the burden than would accompany plaintiff's.
Moreover, in cases where the "components" approach is proper,
the probabilities are against this state of affairs ever arising. No
Michigan case presents this question.
G. Valuing Saved Non-Overhead Realty "on Hand"
As indicated earlier, "on hand" items are not properly- valued
by their cost. Moreover, actual resale value is inappropriate in
most cases involving realty. Actual resale value turns on the
highest price an actual buyer was willing to pay for the land on
the date of valuation. Since on any given day there are usually
few buyers, if any, interested in a given tract except those who are
in the market for a sacrifice sale, actual resale value of land tends
to reflect the sacrifice sale market. Inasmuch as most tracts would
bring substantially more if kept on the market longer, actual
resale value understates the land's resale value in many instances.
Hypothetical resale valuation of land avoids this difficulty, since
the expert describes a willing buyer, not a sacrifice sale buyer.
The Michigan cases permit hypothetical resale valuation of the
saved realty. 141
141 See cases cited in note 112 supra. See also Annots., 7 A.L.R.2d 781 (1949); 52
A.L.R. 1511 (1928). I have suggested that hypothetical resale value should be confined to
realty and actual resale value should be applied to personalty. There is administrative convenience in this, but it erroneously values a few items. Short-term leases, for reasons
elaborated later, should not be valued at hypothetical resale value unless an adjustment
is made. See text infra at 888, relating to a discussion of valuing saved services "on
hand." 'Where the personalty being valued is valuable, but slow-moving, and no alter-
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If plaintiff has not resold the saved realty before trial and the
probabilities are high that he never had and never will have an
opportunity to resell it, neither actual nor hypothetical resale
value should be used. Some other valuation technique must be
attempted to measure what economic benefit, if any, plaintiff
gained by not transferring this realty to defendant. In one Michigan case142 plaintiff saved clay which defendant had contracted to
extract from plaintiff's land and make into bricks. There was evidence that the clay had no value to anyone except an adjacent brick
manufacturer, and defendant, the only person that fit that category, was not interested in the clay. The court, quite properly,
suggested that rather than valuing the clay at zero, as the trial
judge had done, the parties should be permitted to show "whether
plaintiff's land is worth more, and if so how much more, without
the clay having been excavated than it would have been if it had
been excavated 12 to 15 feet below the natural level of the land." 143
In the circumstances, it was a sensible approach to valuation, since
it was most unlikely that plaintiff would realize any economic
gain by resale of the saved clay, but not unlikely that he would
some day realize gain by selling the entire tract for purposes other
than clay excavation.
H. Burden of Proving the Value of Saved Realty
The Michigan court very properly gives plaintiff the burden
of proving the value of saved realty.144 This gives the burden to
the party who more often has superior access to the evidence, prefers undercompensation to its converse, and places the burden on
the party who usually suffers least if he fails to carry it. Where
plaintiff cannot establish the hypothetical resale value of the land
(a rare situation), he normally can vindicate his expectations by
resort to a price or specific performance remedy.14 5

I. Valuing Personalty "on Hand"
As with all "on hand" items, cost value is irrelevant, and valuation should be done by reference to the best use to which plainnative remedy, such as price or specific performance, is available to the seller, hypothetical
resale value should be used for the same reasons as in the realty cases. A ship, for example,
should be valued in this manner. No Michigan case raises the problem.
Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N.W. 560 (1941).
Id. at 72, 295 N.W. at 564.
See McColl v. Wardowski, 280 Mich. 374, 273 N.W. 736 (1937).
Price remedy: Wesorick v. Winans, 277 Mich. 589, 269 N.W. 609 (1936); Allen
v. Mohn, 86 Mich. 328, 49 N.W. 626 (1891); Curran v. Rogers, 35 Mich. 221 (1876).
Specific performance: Lutz v. Dutmer, 286 Mich. 467, 282 N.W. 431 (1938); Pearson v.
Gardner, 202 Mich. 360, 168 N.W. 485 (1918).
142
143
144
145

1963]

THE SELLER'S DAMAGES

887

tiff either does, or should have, put the saved personalty. Normally
the best use is "resale" on terms substantially the same as the
attempted "sale" to defendant. ("Sale" is used here to include
bailment, if the original contract with defendant was one of bailment-a "sale" of the temporary use of the goods.)
Actual, not hypothetical, resale value normally should be used
because of its superior accuracy. Where prior to trial plaintiff
made a resale that accords with mitigation notions,146 it should fix
actual resale value. Absent any resale, or absent proof that the resale met mitigation tests, the court has a variety of devices available for approximating actual resale value: (I) evidence of bids
solicited by plaintiff from potential purchasers of the personalty
at or about the time of breach notice; 147 (2) prices prevailing in
commodity exchanges at the time of breach notice, the exchanges
in question being feasibly accessible to plaintiff; 148 (3) prices prevailing in commodity exchanges either at a different time than
when notice of the breach was received or at an exchange not
feasibly accessible to plaintiff, but with an allowance for transportation expenses to that exchange.149
No Michigan case has faced the situation in which plaintiff's
only evidence of the resale value of personalty is expert testimony
of what a willing buyer would have paid. 150 The Michigan court's
146 To establish that the actual sale was in accord with mitigation notions, plaintiff
should be permitted to show his efforts to obtain the highest possible price. Statutes
often prescribe the procedures for such a sale, providing in that event for a statutory
remedy which is identical to expectation damages in all respects but one-the value of
the subtrahend is fixed at the gross receipts of such a sale even if the sale did not occur
on the date when the subtrahend would otherwise be valued. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws
§ 440.60 (1948); UNIFORM SALES ACT § 60. See generally Annots., 119 A.L.R. 1141 (1939);
44 A.L.R. 296 (1926).
147 See Record, pp. 59-60, Gulf Vegetable & Fruit Co. v. Lane, 258 Mich. 634, 242
N.W. 792 (1932); Record, pp. 94-96, Taylor v. Goldsmith, 228 Mich. 259, 200 N.W. 254
(1924).
148 See Record, pp. 22, 37-39, Taylor v. Goldsmith, supra note 147; Record, pp. 90,
106, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Co., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923). See also
Annot., 44 A.L.R. 358 (1926).
140 See Pandaleon v. Brecker, 227 Mich. 297, 198 N.W. 953 (1924); Aulls v. Young, 98
Mich. 231, 57 N.W. 119 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W.
864 (1889).
150 Where defendant objects to such evidence as uncertain and plaintiff still has
available a price or specific performance remedy, he should be forced to use those
remedies rather than to expose defendant to the risk of overcompensation. Where neither
of those expectation-vindicating remedies are available, the decision cannot be made
intelligently by hard and fast rules, but must tum on such things as: (I) whether plaintiff's failure to establish actual resale value reflected the difficulties inherent in the
situation or slipshod trial preparation; (2) the amount of overcompensation to which
defendant would be exposed by hypothetical resale value testimony; (3) whether plaintiff earlier had an opportunity to avoid his present dilemma by a proper resale according
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valuation of saved personalty differs in no way from the views here
expressed. 151

J.

Valuing Non-Overhead Services "on Hand"
The Michigan Supreme Court has encountered only one kind
of non-overhead services "on hand"-the full-time services of the
individual plaintiff himself (or partners themselves) which, but
for breach, would have been devoted to the performance of the
balance of his contract with defendant. The court has valued such
items consistently at actual resale value, the appropriate valuation
technique. 152 Cost valuation of all "on hand" items is inappropriate, as indicated previously. Indeed, it is impossible in this situation. As between actual resale value and hypothetical resale value
the former is to be preferred. Use of hypothetical resale value,
with its arbitrary assumption that a willing buyer exists, distorts
reality if in fact no such buyer exists. In its application to property to be transferred permanently this distortion deprives plaintiff only of compensation for the interest on the resale value of
the land between the date of breach and the date when he actually
could have resold the land. Compared to the total value of the
land, this sum is trifling. Applied to "on hand" services, however,
hypothetical resale value distorts reality much more. 103 It deprives
plaintiff of compensation for the saved time itself during the interval between breach and the date when actual resale would occur.
to mitigation standards, or by suing for price or specific performance; (4) whether the
commodity is valuable, but slow-moving. See note 141 supra.
A comparable situation involving a plaintiff-buyer arose in Sauer v. McClinticMarshall Constr. Co., 189 Mich. 577, 155 N.W. 586 (1915). Plaintiff carried the burden of proving "market value" (the highest price a reasonable man in plaintiff's
plight would have paid for cover goods upon defendant's failure to deliver as agreed)
by expert testimony as to the market value of such goods on the critical day. Plaintiff
could not establish market value in any other way since there was no organized exchange
anywhere for the goods in question (structural steel designed for this one project), and
plaintiff never sampled the market by soliciting bids after breach. Plaintiff had no
specific performance or price remedy available, and the jury verdict affirmed was for
$651-some $400 less than the spread between the contract price and the price plaintiff
in fact paid to the seller with whom he covered.
151 See, e.g., Peters v. Cooper, 95 Mich. 191, 54 N.W. 694 (1893); Simons v. Ypsilanti
Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889); Brownlee v. Bolton, 44 Mich. 218, 6 N.W.
657 (1880). See also Annot., 130 A.L.R. 1336 (1941).
152 See, e.g., Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958):
Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954): Callender v. Myers
Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930); Hamilton v. Stephens, 240 Mich.
228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893).
153 It has similar distorting effects whenever the saved commodity is the "time" of
someone or something. That is, whenever the contract called for a temporary transfer
of the benefit of something. The shorter the "time" saved, the more significant the
distortion.
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Since the defendant-employer has the greatest incentive to breach
in times of recession or depression, which are the times when plaintiff has the greatest difficulty in finding re-employment, the result
is undercompensation (and reduced deterrence of breach) at the
precise time when there is the greatest social need for full compensation and such deterrence as accompanies it.
•
Actual resale value, while better than hypothetical resale value,
still has a major disadvantage: in some situations the party with
the burden of proving what plaintiff should have earned by reasonable efforts to resell his released time cannot carry the burden
despite diligent trial preparation. Thus, allocation of the burden
frequently results in a judicial choice between over and undercompensation. The situations that cause trouble are those in which
plaintiff, for all or part of the term of his contract remaining after
breach, fails to secure other employment which pays him as much
as he would have earned under the contract. If plaintiff has the
burden of showing that he could not have earned more by reasonable efforts to mitigate, he usually cannot demonstrate the fact.
If defendant must prove he could have earned more (and how
much more), he usually cannot prove the fact. 154 The methods
of proving actual resale value conventionally used in cases involving personaltyrn 5 are ill-adapted to the cases where saved "on
hand" services are involved. And, unlike plaintiff-lessor, plaintiffemployee has no alternative expectation remedy156 to vindicate
his expectation interest.
K. Burden of Proving Saved Non-Overhead Services "on Hand"

The Michigan courts properly give defendant the burden of
proving the value of this component. 157 This casts the burden
on the party with inferior access to the evidence, and raises some
In no Michigan case has defendant carried this burden successfully.
See text at note 146 supra.
lti6 The plaintiff-employee has an alternative remedy of money restitution (quantum
meruit), but this only vindicates his restitution interesL To the extent that his expectation interest exceeds his restitution interest quantum meruit recovery is undercompensatory. The problem is acute where plaintiff has yet to perform the bulk of a contract which
would be very profitable, or where he has rendered much of his performance but as yet
has delivered nothing to defendant. E.g., Hosmer v. Wilson, 7 Mich. 293 (1859) (plaintiffseller was to manufacture and deliver an engine; repudiation by defendant preceded
completion of the engine; no recovery permitted for "work and labor done'). At one
time plaintiff had a price recovery on the now discredited doctrine of "constructive
service." See Annots., 17 A.L.R. 629 (1922); 8 A.L.R. 338 (1920).
Hi7 See Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., 353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958); Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954); Farrell v. School Dist., 98
Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893).
lu4
ltiti
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risk of overcompensation.158 However, the risk of overcompensation is not too great. While defendant normally cannot prove
with requJsite certainty what plaintiff should have earned, 100 he
usually can prove what plaintiff in fact earned with his breachreleased time. 160 Thus, the maximum overcompensation which is
likeTy to occur is the difference between what plaintiff earned
and what he should have earned.
For those parts of the term during which plaintiff found fulltime re-employment the probabilities are that he found work as
remunerative as the mitigation notion would require him to find.
For those parts of the term during which plaintiff failed to take
full-time re-employment, there is some likelihood that more effort
would have produced a job, especially if plaintiff is not the head
of the household, and is tempted to retire from the labor force
upon defendant's breach.161 If plaintiff is the head of the household, the probabilities are that the idleness was forced, rather
than voluntary. It would be unusual for a full-time employee to
watch his income stop altogether in the hope that successful litigation will recoup it without labor.
Such risks of overcompensation as exist in this handling of
the burden should be run. 162 In this situation, overcompensation,
not its converse, facilitates loss distribution and loss absorption.
Normally the full-time employee is much less able to perform
these functions than defendant, his employer. Splitting the loss
among them puts part of it on the plaintiff-employee, who normally cannot distribute it in the cost of his product nor absorb
it without serious dislocation of his family's economy.
L. Minor Adjustments to the Value of Components and
Incidental Damages
Where breach enabled plaintiff to avoid acquiring a particular
item, what he saved by not acquiring it may exceed the price he
158 See Ogden v. George F. Alger Co., supra note 157, where defendant failed to show
what plaintiff earned or should have earned during a ten-year term. Plaintiff-employee
recovered over $40,000 when the subtrahend was valued at zero, although the record suggests that plaintiff's actual earnings from two new enterprises were substantial.
159 See note 154 supra.
160 E.g., Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922); Milligan v. Sligh
Furniture Co., 111 Mich. 629, 70 N.W. 133 (1897). But see Ogden v. George F. Alger Co.,
353 Mich. 402, 91 N.W.2d 288 (1958).
161 The possibility was present in several cases in which plaintiff-schoolteachers
failed to obtain re-employment. E.g., Edgecomb v. School Dist., 341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d
87 (1954); Farrell v. School Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893). But it is also possible
that no other teaching job could be found at the time when defendant breached.
162 If the saved non-overhead services on hand are those of plaintiff's employee or
contractor, this is not true, and the burden should be plaintiff's. No Michigan case
involves such facts.
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would have paid for the item. If, but for breach, he would have
incurred miscellaneous additional charges in the process of locating a supplier, transporting the item to his storage point or job
site, or maintaining and protecting the item until the time it is
used in performing defendant's contract, these additional saved
charges should be reflected in the subtrahend. They should be
valued at cost and defendant should have the burden of proving
their existence and value. Since they represent additions to the
subtrahend, the consequences for defendant for failing to carry
the burden as to any one of them are less dire than plaintiff's
consequences would be. No Michigan case appears to raise an
issue as to such items.
Where plaintiff did or should have resold "on hand" components, the actual resale value of the components does not necessarily accurately reflect their value to plaintiff. In the process of
actually reselling them he may have been obliged to incur charges
in finding a new purchaser, delivering the items to him, or maintaining and protecting the items during the interval between notice of breach and resale. These charges should be subtracted from
the subtrahend to reflect more accurately what plaintiff saved because of defendant's breach. His true savings are not the gross
receipts the resale purchaser paid, but the gross receipts less those
charges.
Often plaintiff incurred, or would have incurred, charges of
a similar kind had he completed performance with defendant.
Without breach his performance might entail expense in locating
defendant as a buyer, storing or maintaining property slated for
delivery to defendant, freight to defendant, etc. If these have already been incurred they have no proper place in the subtrahend;
they were not saved. 163 If they have not been incurred, they have
been taken into account already as non-overhead items "yet to
be incurred." For example, if plaintiff incurred liability to a
broker who found defendant as a prospective purchaser, and defendant's breach does not enable plaintiff to escape such liability,
the broker's commission is not relevant to subtrahend valuation.
If plaintiff incurs another broker's charge for finding the resale
purchaser, that second broker's commission should be taken into
account as an adjustment of the subtrahend or in some other
fashion. Otherwise the subtrahend is overvalued. If defendant's
163 They are relevant to a reliance damage remedy, however. See Biddle v. Biddle,
202 Mich. 160, 168 N.W. 92 (1918). But see Hubbard v. Epworth, 69 Mich. 92, 36 N.W.
801 (1888).
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breach lets plaintiff escape liability to the first broker, the service
for which such broker would have collected but for breach is a
non-overhead item "yet to be acquired."
In one Michigan case164 a Detroit plaintiff saved goods which
he had contracted to deliver to defendant in Ypsilanti. After
breach he resold them to a buyer in Milwaukee. The court held
that plaintiff should recover the difference between (the contract
price less the freight from Detroit to Ypsilanti) and (the gross receipts paid by the Milwaukee purchaser less the freight from
Detroit to Milwaukee). This achieved the same effect as the
treatment suggested here.
Some courts on occasion treat these extra charges attending
resale as items of incidental damages. This treatment does not
alter the result (if double-counting is avoided),1 65 except in the
rare case where the subtrahend, even when adjusted so as to reflect these charges, exceeds the minuend. In that situation these
charges are recovered if treated as incidental damages and not recovered if treated as adjustments to the subtrahend.166
Where the saved component is realty, and it has been resold
before trial, these additional charges should be recovered in similar fashion.
If the component is being valued by actual or hypothetical resale
value, although there has been no resale prior to trial, these charges
have not in fact been incurred, and it is impossible to treat the
charges as items of incidental damages. Nonetheless, if their existence and value are shown with requisite certainty, they should be
recovered as adjustments to the subtrahend. For example, if it is
clear that plaintiff would have had to pay a broker at least 1,000
dollars to effect a resale, the 1,000 dollars should be taken into
account although plaintiff has not and never will resell. If he had
resold, the assumption under which the item was valued, he would
have incurred this charge.
Plaintiff should have the burden of proving the existence and
value of all such charges. Since they enhance the value of the subtrahend, the consequences are less dire when he fails to carry the
burden of proof: the particular charge is deemed non-existent,
leaving the rest of the subtrahend intact. If defendant had the
Simons v. Ypsilanti Paper Co., 77 Mich. 185, 43 N.W. 864 (1889).
See REsTATEMENT § 333, comment f.
See text at note 24 supra. Courts that permit plaintiff recovery of reliance damages
without reduction to reflect what he would have lost had he completed performance
should, to be consistent, permit plaintiff at his option to treat the item as one of
incidental damages.
164
165
166

1963]

THE SELLER'S DAMAGES

893

burden, his failure to establish the non-existence of any item
would have to be visited with valuing the entire subtrahend
at zero. 167 No Michigan case raises these problems.
IV.

"ENTITY" VALUATION

A. "Entity" or "Components" Valuation?
In the bulk of cases the court can avoid making this choice·.168
Where plaintiff saved a single component, of course the component
is the entity, and the two approaches are identical. 169 Even when
more than one component has been saved, the two approaches
sometimes are the same. To explain this something must be said
of the minor adjustments that must be made to the subtrahend
when an "entity" approach is used.
The "entity" approach assumes that plaintiff did or should
have delivered to a resale purchaser some performance once scheduled for defendant. In the process of reselling plaintiff may incur
charges in locating the resale purchaser, delivering the entity to
him, storing or maintaining it or parts of it during the interval
between breach notice and resale of the entity, etc. Breach may
also permit the plaintiff to avoid incurring similar charges which
he would have incurred had he completed his scheduled performance with defendant. Under a "components" approach, the adjustments to the subtrahend (or the incidental damages) are the
additional charges involved in resale. However, under an "entity"
approach, the adjustments (or incidental damages) are this sum
minus similar charges saved by not completing performance with
defendant.
The "entity" and "components" approaches differ in their
See text supra at 884-85.
In only five cases did the Supreme Court face this choice: Demirjian v. Kurtis,
353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958); Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co.,
166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911); Petrie v: Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885);
Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239
(1872). In Loud the argument for "entity" valuation was "faintly pressed." In Demirjian
plaintiff contended that he should prevail in either event. In Hopkins the only question
was one of burden of proof. In the other two cases the trial judge excluded evidence
bearing on the propriety of "entity" valuation, so that in reversing the court did not
have to make this choice but had to decide only that the choice should be explored
more thoroughly below. In several other cases the facts presented this choice, but
counsel failed to see it. E.g., Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192
N.W. 668 (1923); Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904);
Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888).
100 E.g., St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670, 262 N.W. 437 (1935); Goldsmith v.
Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Gallino v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191
N.W. 222 (1922); Burrell v. New York & Saginaw Solar Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865).
167
168
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adjustments (or incidental damages) because only the latter approach takes into account, as non-overhead items "yet to be incurred," the saved charges that would have been incurred had
plaintiff completed performance with defendant. Since under
an "entity" approach these saved charges cannot be taken into
account in that fashion, they must be taken into account in the
process of adjusting the subtrahend or in the process of computing incidental damages. Under an "entity" approach, for example, the incidental damages or subtrahend adjustments are not
the freight charges from Detroit to Milwaukee in our earlier fact
situation. They are the difference between Detroit-Milwaukee and
Detroit-Ypsilanti freight costs.
Now it is possible to explain how "entity" and "components"
approaches can be identical although more than one component
was saved. This occurs where all the saved components are either
(a) non-overhead "on hand" items, or (b) non-overhead "yet to
be acquired" items which would be taken into account in adjusting the subtrahend (or computing incidental damages) under an
"entity" approach_17° Returning to the Ypsilanti-Detroit-Milwaukee situation, it can be seen that "entity" and "components" approaches are identical there. Under a "components" approach the
saved components are the "on hand" :finished goods and the saved
freight to Ypsilanti. The adjustment or the incidental damages is
the freight to Milwaukee. Under an "entity" approach the entity
is the "on hand" :finished goods, and the adjustment or incidental
damages is the difference between freight to Milwaukee and freight
to Ypsilanti.
Even in those situations where the facts present an opportunity
for a significant choice between approaches, the judges may avoid
the necessity for choice if counsel are in agreement as to the approach to be taken. In one Michigan case171 where the choice
between "entity" and "components" valuation might have been
most difficult for the court to resolve, counsel were in agreement
that a "components" approach should be used. Counsel did not
see the formula which plaintiff proposed and as to which defendant acquiesced in all major respects172 as involving "components" valuation of the subtrahend, but upon analysis it turns out
See note 164 supra.
Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923).
Defendant's only quarrel with plaintiff's proposed measure of damages concerned
the timing of measuring the value of certain raw materials; defendant never urged
an "entity" approach, which would have resulted in much larger recovery by plaintiff.
See text infra at 897.
170
171
172
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to be an algebraic equivalent of the approach sketched previously
in this article.
Plaintiff corporation, a manufacturer of artificial leather,
sought expectation damages from buyer corporation, which had
repudiated the contract before the goods were delivered. At the
time of breach, plaintiff had completed the manufacture of, but
had not delivered, 6,848 yards of goods, and another 46,464 yards
remained to be manufactured. In order to manufacture these
remaining 46,464 yards, plaintiff needed 46,464 yards of unfinished cloth, and the other raw materials used in transforming such
cloth into artificial leather. At about the same time as the plaintiff-defendant contract was formed, plaintiff contracted· with a
cloth supplier for the cloth that was to be used in performing the
defendant's order. The agreed price was I.IO dollars per yard.
At the time when defendant breached, the cloth supplier had
delivered to plaintiff some, but not all, of the cloth needed to
complete manufacture of an additional 46,464 yards of finished
product. The plaintiff had the power then to refuse further deliveries from this supplier, and such termination would not have
exposed plaintiff to liability to the supplier inasmuch as the supplier was at that time seriously in default in his performance.
After defendant's repudiation plaintiff did not complete manufacture of the 46,464 yards, nor did plaintiff resell the finished
6,848 yards then on hand. Between the time when the plaintiffdefendant contract was formed and the time when it was repudiated prices fell sharply in both the market in which plaintiff sold
his finished product and the market in which plaintiff bought his
raw materials. Cloth was selling for .32625 dollars per yard at
the time of defendant's repudiation.
Under a "components" approach, the minuend would be the
unpaid balance of the price-104,846 dollars. The subtrahend
would be the total of the value of all saved components. The
saved 6,848 yards of finished goods (valued at actual resale value)
were worth 2,602 dollars. The saved costs of transforming 46,464
yards of unfinished cloth into artificial leather (dyeing, coating,
labor, overhead, inspection) totalled 29,565 dollars. The saved
cloth that would have been consumed in manufacturing another
46,464 yards of artificial leather must be separated into two categories-"on hand" and "yet to be acquired" cloth. The "on hand"
cloth should be valued at its actual resale value on the date of
notice of breach-.32625 dollars per yard. The "yet to be acquired" cloth should be valued at its cost of acquisition. If this
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is determined as of the date when plaintiff first contracted with his
supplier for it, this cloth should be valued at 1.10 dollars per
yard; if the proper time for determination is the time of notice
of breach, it should be valued at .32625 dollars per yard.
Thus, if we assume that the "yet to be acquired" cloth should
be valued by what it would have cost to acquire it at the time of
notice of breach, it has the same value as the "on hand" cloth.32625 dollars per yard. (While the "on hand" cloth is valued at
resale value and the "yet to be acquired" cloth is valued at acquisition cost, these figures are in effect the same because plaintiff
would acquire or resell this cloth in the same market. 173) Assuming that all the saved cloth is properly valued at .32625 dollars
per yard, its value to plaintiff is 15,170 dollars. Still using this
assumption, the total value of the components is 47,337 dollars
and plaintiff's recovery would be 57,509 dollars.
In the trial court plaintiff persuaded the judge to submit the
case to the jury on a measurement formula which was actually an
algebraic equivalent of the "components" approach, and which
permitted a recovery of 57,512 dollars174 as sketched above. Plaintiff's theory gave him the sum of three items: 10,864 dollars for
"loss on finished goods"; 7,309 dollars for "loss of profits on 46,464
yards not made"; and 39,339 dollars for "loss on material for 46,464
yards." Plaintiff's rationale for the three items was roughly this:
the contract can be divided into two parts, one embracing the finished goods, and one embracing the unfinished goods. Plaintiff's
first item of damages (10,864 dollars) reflected the first (finished
goods) part of the contract. His other two items of damages reflected the unfinished goods part of the contract. As to these unfinished goods he argued that he should recover "the difference
between the amount it would cost him to make and deliver them,
including the cost of the materials, and their contract price ..."m
-his second item of 7,309 dollars. And, "if materials have been
purchased with which to fulfill the contract, but no work has been
bestowed upon them at the time of the breach [plaintiff argued,
plaintiff should further recover] the difference between the cost
173 If plaintiff would incur expense in accomplishing acquisition and/or resale of
the cloth, the resale and costs values are not identical even though they are accomplished
in the same market, because such expenses are added to the market price to give the
adjusted cost of acquisition, but are subtracted from the market price to give the
adjusted resale price.
174 The $3 discrepancy between this figure and that in the prior paragraph is due
to my rounding off fractions for simplicity.
175 Brief for Plaintiff, p. 92, quoting Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co., 92 Fed. 486,
490 (8th Cir. 1899).
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and the market value of the materials that have been purchased
at the time of the breach, if the market value be less than the
cost" 176-the third item of 39,339 dollars.
Plaintiff did not attempt to justify the formula except by stating that it was first uttered in Judge Sanborn's "great leading
case on the subject" (Kingman v. Western Mfg. Co.), and was
approved in Sedgwick's treatise on damages. 177
The weakness of plaintiff's formula lay in the third item of
39,339 dollars, which, according to Judge Sanborn's language, is
recoverable only if "materials have been purchased with which
to fulfill the contract." As defendant pointed out, in the trial
court plaintiff had recovered in the third item for the cost/market
difference of all materials that would have gone into an additional
46,464 yards of artificial leather, although not all of these materials
were on hand at the time of notice of breach. If the rationale underlying the allowance of this third item is to permit plaintiff to
recover for the loss he sustained when the resale value of raw
materials that he purchased in reliance on the contract and had
on hand at the time of breach declined, no recovery should be
permitted for the decline in value of materials which plaintiff
never purchased nor obligated himself irrevocably to purchase.
On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court followed plaintiff's
analysis of the situation, treating the three times separately. Plaintiff's recovery of the first two items was approved routinely, since
they were uncontested on appeal.1 78 Turning then to the third
item, the court sided with defendant: there was reversible error
in permitting plaintiff to recover the cost/market spread of those
raw materials which at the time of breach he neither had in his
possession nor was obligated to accept and pay for. Since he could
terminate his contract to accept further cloth with impunity, the
mitigation notion required that he do so upon learning of defendant's breach. 179
Had the case been presented in both courts as a straightforward
suit for expectation damages with the subtrahend valued one component at a time, the issue on appeal would have appeared differently. Then the issue would have been: in fixing the saved cost
of acquiring the raw materials as yet undelivered at the time of
breach, should they be valued as of the time when plaintiff orig176 Ibid.
177 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 752 (9th ed. 1912).
178 222 Mich. at 100-01, 192 N.W. at 670.
179 Id. at 101-02, 192 N.W. at 670-71.
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inally contracted with his supplier to pay I.IO dollars per yard
for them, or as the date of breach, when plaintiff could have repudiated his contract with his cloth supplier and purchased the
cloth on the open market for .32625 dollars per yard? The supreme court's refusal to allow recovery of the part of the plaintiff's third item which represented the cost/market spread on raw
materials that would have gone into plaintiff's performance but
for breach, but which were yet to be acquired at the time of
breach, had the identical economic effect as a decision to use the
"components approach" would have had, valuing such materials
at the earlier date, rather than at the later date, as was done by
the trial court.
The present object is not to get involved in a discussion of
the appropriate time for valuing such components; the timing of
valuation is a topic beyond the scope of this article. Rather, it is
suggested that in this case the trial and appellate courts were using
a "components" approach without knowing it, and counsel were
similarly in agreement that "components" valuation should be
attempted.
Plaintiff's acquiescence in a "components" approach in this
case, although an "entity" approach would give him greater recovery, may have been due to failure to appreciate the possible
alternative, to doubts that he could persuade judge and jury to
use an "entity" approach, or to the belief that section 64 of the
Uniform Sales Act, which plaintiff quoted in his brief,180 forbade
greater recovery than that computed under a "components" approach.
Section 64(4) of the Uniform Sales Act,181 in effect in Michigan at the time the plaintiff-defendant contract was formed, 182
addresses itself to the choice which plaintiff-manufacturer faces
when his buyer repudiates before fabrication of the goods is completed. It is very clear that in no event can plaintiff recover
Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 90-91.
MICH. COMP. LAws § 440.64(4) (1948): "If, while labor or expense of material
amount are necessary on the part of the seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations
under the contract to sell or the sale, the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale,
or notifies the seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be liable to the
seller for no greater damages than the seller would have suffered if he did nothing
toward carrying out the contract or the sale after receiving notice of the buyer's repu•
diation or countermand. The profit the seller would have made if the contract or the
sale had been fully performed, shall be considered in estimating such damages,"
Michigan's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.1101.9994 (Supp. 1962), will repeal the above provision, effective Jan. 1, 1964.
182 The Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Michigan in 1913.
180
181
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greater damages than those he would have sustained had he stopped
work toward completion and resale of the goods upon notice of
breach.183 But the draftsmen of the statute were much less clear
as to just what damages plaintiff would have sustained had he
stopped work upon notice of breach. The draftsmen's certainty
returned in prescribing that the court should "consider" the plaintiff's lost profits (however they might be computed). But no direction was given as to how to proceed after this period of contemplation was concluded.
Michigan has recently adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code,184 but its provisions on this point, according to which the
trial court is enjoined to depart from "entity" valuation of the
subtrahend if that "measure of damages ... is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done,"
are almost equally as mysterious, 185 as the text of the statute contains no clue as to when that measure is "inadequate." The comment to section 2-708 mutters darkly about "fixed price articles,"
"standard priced goods," and "list price,"186 suggesting that the
pricing practices of the plaintiff are determinative in some situa183 This seems to flout the general mitigation notions (1) that plaintiff need not take
a certain post-breach course that would reduce damages if it would expose him to un•
reasonable risk or loss or hardship, and (2) plaintiff's damages will not be reduced
because in his efforts to choose a course of mitigation he selected one which, although
apparently reasonable when selected, ultimately proved less frugal than some alternative
course.
184 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.1101-.9994 (Supp. 1962).
185 UNIFORM Co111111ERCIAL CODE § 2-708, which reads: "Seller's Damages for Nonacceptance or Repudiation.
"(l) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to
proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and
place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
buyer's breach.
"(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the
seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made
from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in
this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit
for payments or proceeds of resale."
186 UNIFORM COlll!IIERCIAL CODE § 2-708, comment 2, which states: "The provision
of this section permitting recovery of expected profit including reasonable overhead
where the standard measure of damages is inadequate, together with the new requirement that price actions may be sustained only where resale is impractical, are designed
to eliminate the unfair and economically wasteful results arising under the older law
when fixed price articles were involved. This section permits the recovery of lost profits
in all appropriate cases, which would include all standard priced goods. The normal
measure there would be list price less cost to the dealer or list price less manufacturing
cost to the manufacturer. It is not necessary to a recovery of 'profit' to show a history.
of earnings, especially if a new venture is involved."
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tions. 187 In any event, when "entity" valuation of the subtrahend
would give inadequate recovery, the proper measure under the
UCC is "the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the
seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with incidental damages ... , due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds from
resale." How "reasonable overhead" gets included in "profit" is
not explained. Nor is there any explanation of the meaning of
the term "proceeds of resale" in a case, like that just discussed,
where at the time of trial plaintiff resold neither the entity nor
the saved "on hand" components. When a court is forced to a
choice between "entity" and "components" valuation of the subtrahend, the ultimate question is this: in the light of the notions
of mitigation and breach-caused gains, was plaintiff reasonable in
his post-breach choice between (1) stopping all further work on
the contract, and (2) completing work on the contract with an eye
to resale of the entity to another buyer?
If counsel frame the issue as a choice between "entity" and
"components" valuation of the subtrahend,188 four basic fact situations can arise: (1) plaintiff completes work on the entity and at
trial wants an "entity" approach to be adopted; (2) plaintiff stops
further work and at trial wants a "components" approach to be
taken; (3) plaintiff completes work and at trial wants a "components" approach; (4) plaintiff abandons work and at trial wants
an "entity" approach.
In the first two situations, where plaintiff's choice of valuation
technique corresponds with his post-breach course of action, the
court should accept plaintiff's approach to valuation unless (a)
187 The language savors of English decisions involving car dealers. See Thompson
v. Robinson, [1955] 2 Weekly L.R. 185. These have been criticized by Professor Marshall
on the grounds that parties should not be able to bootstrap themselves out of the
normal measure of damages by arguing their own restrictive marketing practices. Com•
ment, 34 CAN. B. REv. 969, 971 (1956).
188 Usually the issue is not framed by counsel in this manner. Plaintiff will typically
argue for a "components" approach by saying he is entitled to "lost profits." E.g., Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., 250 Mich. 298, 230 N.W. 154 (1930); Atkinson v. Morse,
63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62, 16 N.W. 232 (1883).
Defendant may not counter by arguing for an "entity" approach, but by arguing that
plaintiff is not among the class entitled to "lost profits." E.g., Hamilton v. Stephens, 240
Mich. 228, 215 N.W. 321 (1927); Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W.
127 (1904); Goodrich v. Hubbard, supra. Or that the "lost profits" are "speculative."
E.g., Detroit Independent Sprinkler Co. v. Plywood Prods. Corp., 311 Mich. 226, 18
N.W.2d 387 (1945); Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976
(1896); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888). Or that some items are
not proved with certainty. E.g., Moline Furniture ,vorks v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich.
587, 274 N.W. 338 (1937); Callender v. Myers Regulator Co., supra; Detroit Fireproofing
Tile Co. v. Vinton Co., 190 Mich. 275, 157 N.W. 8 (1916).
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plaintiff should have known at the time he made the choice that
it would enhance damages and (b) it would not require undue
risk or self-sacrifice for plaintiff to take the opposite course. Defendant should have the burden of showing that plaintiff's choice
violated mitigation notions because in the frequently-encountered
"no proof" situation the probability is that plaintiff's choice accords with mitigation notions. This is true because plaintiff's selfinterest normally leads him to mitigate damages; it is the rare
plaintiff who is so sure of a future victory in court that he is willing to incur unnecessary expense after breach in order to increase
the size of his future judgment.
In the last two of the four situations, where plaintiff's choice
of valuation technique runs counter to his post-breach course of
conduct, the court should side with defendant. Defendant's preference for a technique that coincides with what plaintiff actually
did rests on defendant's belief that that valuation technique will
result in lower damage recovery. The mitigation notion and the
notion of breach-caused gains favor such a valution technique.
Plaintiff's only possible counter-argument is the fallacious assertion that since mitigation notions did not require him to take the
post-breach course he took, in valuation, that course should be
disregarded. The fallacy lies in overlooking the notion that breachcaused gains, even though resulting from gambles not required by
the mitigation notion, must be taken into account. 189
The first of these four situations (plaintiff completed work and
wanted to use an "entity" approach, but defendant wanted a "components" approach) has not arisen in Michigan. The closest case
involved a plaintiff who published a trade journal in which an
ad was to be run weekly for a year, plaintiff seeking damages when
defendant repudiated before the end of the year. 190 Defendant
made a feeble effort at trial to establish that plaintiff would sustain
no damages if the subtrahend was valued by components saved, 191
but the effort was abandoned by the time the case reached the
supreme court. There both parties were agreed upon the use of
an "entity" approach.
The second situation (plaintiff abandons work and wants a
"components" approach at trial, but defendant wants an "entity"
approach) arose in Loud v. Campbe[l.1!!2 Plaintiff, owner of a ship,
189 See text supra at 850, 859.
1no Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, lll N.W. 343 (1907).
101 Record, p. 26, Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., supra note 190.
rn2 26 Mich. 239 (1872).
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contracted to load the vessel with defendant's lumber at Au Sable
and carry the cargo to Buffalo. Defendant's breach occurred when
the ship was lying off Au Sable, before the lumber was loaded.
Plaintiff, unable. to berth at Au Sable because of weather conditions, thereupon abandoned all plans for a voyage from Au Sable
to Buffalo, ordering the vessel to return to its home port, Detroit.
Plaintiff sought to value the subtrahend by including the various
saved components-the costs yet to be incurred in the voyage from
Au Sable to Buffalo. Defendant sought to value the entity-carriage of a shipload of lumber from Au Sable to Buffalo. The court
rejected defendant's argument (which was only "faintly pressed"),1°3
apparently because the weather conditions made it unreasonable
to demand that plaintiff seek to resell the entity by finding another
lumber dealer at Au Sable interested in carriage of a shipload of
lumber to Buffalo.
It arose again in Hopkins v. Sanford 194 where plaintiff sawmill
owner, who had failed to resell the entity (part of his mill's services
for the season), sought a "components" approach and defendant
argued for an "entity" approach. Neither party offered evidence
that plaintiff could have found a new purchaser for the entity had
he sought one late in the season, the time of the breach. The trial
judge charged that defendant had the burden of showing that
plaintiff could have resold the entity, and this was held proper on
appeal. This accords with the notion that where plaintiff picks
one course of action and defendant seeks to use a valuation approach predicated on another course, defendant has the burden of
proving the feasibility of that other course.
The third situation (plaintiff abandoned further work toward
completing the entity and wanted "entity" valuation, defendant
wanting "components" valuation) has not reached the Michigan
Supreme Court. Demirjian v. Kurtis, 195 involving a complex variant on the situation, is discussed subsequently.100
The fourth situation' (plaintiff completes performance but
wants "components" approach at trial, defendant wanting "entity"
approach) has arisen twice in Michigan. In Harrington-Wiard Co.
v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co.,197 plaintiff was a manufacturer of engines
who contracted to furnish a specified number of them to defendant,
193
194
195
196
101

Id. at 244.
41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879).
353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958).
See text at note 230 infra.
166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911).
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a manufacturer of automobiles. Performance of the contract would
have utilized almost the entire productive capacity of plaintiff's
plant for a substantial length of time, so the "entity" could be regarded as that capacity for that time. At trial plaintiff sought to
use a "components" approach, proving the value of the various
items that would have gone into his promised performance. The
trial judge prevented defense counsel from introducing evidence
to the effect that after breach plaintiff had resold almost the entire
productive capacity of his plant to another car manufacturer,
promising to make similar engines for him. The exclusion of this
evidence was deemed reversible error by the supreme court, its
underlying logic undoubtedly being that a "components" approach
would be inappropriate if plaintiff had in fact resold the entity after
breach and defendant wanted "entity" valuation. The court did
not elaborate on its reasons, however.
A comparable situation arose in the first Petrie v. Lane,198 involving a plaintiff selling the services of his lumber mill to defendant, owner of a large number of logs. Cutting defendant's
logs would have fully occupied plaintiff's productive capacity during that year's milling season. Plaintiff sought to use a "components" approach, and was successful in the trial court. The trial
judge excluded defendant's evidence that plaintiff had resold the
entity-his mill's capacity for the season. The court reversed, on
this ground as well as others.
In all four cases-Loud, Hopkins, Harrington-Wiard, and
Petrie, the court reached results that accord with the views expressed here.

B. Valuing the Entity in the Absence of Lost Volume Problems
If the entity consists of real property other than a short-term
lease, 100 the entity should be valued at hypothetical resale value.
Otherwise, it should be valued at actual resale value. 200
If the entity consists of plaintiff's own non-overhead services,
the burden of proving its value should be cast on defendant.
Othenvise, the burden should be on plaintiff.201
Adjustments to reduce the subtrahend202 should be proved by
ms 58

Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885).
Regarding short-term leases, see note 141 supra, and text supra at 888.
The valuation rules here suggested parallel the valuation rules earlier suggested
for various categories of components. The rationale, which would be repetitious, is
omitted.
201 The burden of proof rules here parallel those for "components" valuation. See
text at note 157 supra.
20:i See text supra at 861.
100
200
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plaintiff; adjustments to increase it203 by defendant,204 whether or
not plaintiff in fact resells the entity before trial.
The Michigan case law concerning the valuation techniques
and burden of proving the value of the entity accords with the
views presented here,205 with a single possibly discrepant case.200
Plaintiff there was a trade journal which had contracted to
run defendant's ad weekly for a year on the journal's inside cover.
Defendant agreed to pay at the rate of fifty-five cents per inch.
Before the middle of the year defendant repudiated. Plaintiff attempted with no success to find another purchaser on the same
terms: the same part of the cover, one year, fifty-five cents per
inch. He refused to cut the rate in order to attract another customer. Throughout this period plaintiff was selling less desirable
space on the inside pages of his journal at the rate of forty cents
per inch, and after defendant's breach plaintiff published some
of the ads of his "inside page" customers on the cover, receiving
no additional compensation from them for this improved position.
Had plaintiff filled the entire inside cover with ads at forty cents
per inch, his gross receipts from such advertisers would have been
336 dollars. His gross receipts from the advertisers whose ads he
actually moved to the inside cover were 326.26 dollars.
Plaintiff succeeded in the trial court in having the subtrahend
valued at the gross receipts from "inside page" advertisers whose
ads were moved to the cover-326.26 dollars. At trial and on appeal defendant argued that plaintiff could have received more
than that sum for the breach-released cover space, had he been
willing to cut the price for cover space from fifty-five cents, or
had he been willing to sell the cover space in small bits, instead
of as a single ad, or had he been willing to sell the space to one purchaser for less than a year. The supreme court affirmed the findings and the conclusions of the trial judge who had sat without a
jury. The court remarked, "The burden of proof is on the party
203 If plaintiff saved larger incidental charges for freight, storage, etc., than the incidental charges for finding the repurchaser, freight to him, storage, etc., defendant should
be permitted to increase the subtrahend by the amount of such difference.
204 Compare text supra at 861.
205 In none of the cases where "entity" and "components" approaches differ did the
court reach a question of choice of technique for valuing the entity. In cases where
"entity" and "components" approaches are identical there is harmony between these
views of valuation techniques and the Michigan results. See, e.g., Raycraft v. NorthvilleSix Mile Co., 358 Mich. 466, 100 N.W .2d 223 (1960); St. John v. Richard, 272 Mich. 670,
262 N.W. 437 (1935); Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 225, 200 N.W. 252 (1924); Gallina
v. Boland, 221 Mich. 502, 191 N.W. 222 (1922); Burrell v. New York & Saginaw Solar
Salt Co., 14 Mich. 34 (1865).
206 Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, Ill N.W. 343 (19~7).
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wrongfully repudiating the contract to show to what extent the
damages were lessened or might have been lessened [citing four
cases]. " 207
As I analyze the case, "entity" valuation of the subtrahend was
adopted by both counsel and both courts, the entity being the
space on the cover which defendant's ad would have occupied.
Since the entity was not realty, its actual resale value should fix
the subtrahend. Since the entity did not consist solely of plaintiff's
own non-overhead services "on hand," plaintiff should have had
the burden of showing the actual resale value of the space. A mere
showing of his gross receipts would not carry the burden, since
they might be less than a reasonable man would have garnered.
But plaintiff established at least a prima facie case that his gross
receipts were as high as a reasonable man's would have been, since
he introduced testimony as to his unsuccessful efforts to resell the
space on the same terms as those on which it had been sold to
defendant and further testimony that those were his customary
terms.
Defendant's efforts to break down this prima facie case rested
on two arguments: (I) that plaintiff should have departed from his
customary terms for cover space, and (2) that plaintiff should have
filled all the space, not merely the bulk of it, with transferred
"inside page" ads. The court apparently rejected the latter argument because the adjustment in recovery which it would effect
(less than 10 dollars) was de minimis. Its opinion on motion for
rehearing indicates that it rejected the former argument because
"the plaintiff was under no legal obligation to split up the time
or space covered by the contract.... " 208 In other words, mitigation notions did not compel him to depart from his customary
terms of sale.200
So viewed, the case is consistent with the notions of burden
of proof expressed here. By its remark that defendant had the
burden of proof, the court, according to this view, meant only
that defendant had the onus of rebutting plaintiff's prima facie
case as to the value of the entity. It did not mean that the result
would have been the same had plaintiff failed to introduce any
evidence of the value of the saved entity.
But the four cases cited by the court in support of its position
147 Mich. at 706, lll N.W. at 344.
Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., supra note 206, rehearing denied, 147 Mich.
706, 708, ll2 N.W. 708, 709 (1907).
200 Cf. Annot., 35 A.L.R. 1536 (1925). See generally Annots., 46 A.L.R. ll92, ll94
(1927): 1 A.L.R. 436 (1919).
201
208
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led to a different reading of the case. One was too far from the
point to shed much light.210 But two others211 involved the burden
of proving the value of plaintiff's own non-overhead services "on
hand." In such cases defendant has the "burden" of proving the
value of the subtrahend in the fullest sense: if neither party offers
any evidence of its value, the court gives it a zero value and allows
plaintiff the equivalent of a price recovery. The citation of these
cases suggests that the court recognized no distinction in the allocation of the burden between such cases and others, or, at least,
that i~ regarded the trade journal plaintiff in this plight as somehow akin to the plaintiff-employee. The fourth case cited stresses
this kinship, although in a different context. 212
The court's result accords with the views urged here; its dictum, however, is inconsistent when read in the light of the cases
cited.
C. The Problem of Lost Volume
Sometimes, when plaintiff resells the entity once destined for
defendant to a new buyer, X, plaintiff thereby deprives himself of
something of value-sale of another similar entity to X. Had there
been no breach and consequently no resale, plaintiff would have
sold two similar entities-one to defendant and one to X. The
breach and resale have reduced plaintiff's total volume of sales
by the quantity that was resold to X. 213
210 Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879). See text at note 194 supra.
In Hopkins and the case at bar the issue was the burden of proving what a reasonable
man would have garnered by resale of the entity. But in Hopkins the question arose
as a choice between "entity" and "components" approaches where the two would give
different results and plaintiff had taken a post-breach course consistent with "components"
valuation. In the trade journal case the question arose in the course of deciding whether
the actual resale value of the entity was higher than the gross receipts that plaintiff
garnered by resale, plaintiff having conceded that "entity" valuation was appropriate.
Had plaintiff failed to make this concession and had there been no evidence of a resale
of the space released by breach, the cases would have presented the same problem.
211 See Carver v. School Dist., 113 Mich. 524, 71 N.W. 859 (1897); Farrell v. School
Dist., 98 Mich. 43, 56 N.W. 1053 (1893).
212 Peck &: Co. v. Kansas City Metal Roofing &: Corrugating Co., 96 Mo. App. 212
(1902). There the trade journal plaintiff, upon defendant advertiser's breach, continued
to run his ad for the balance of the term and collected the whole price in the trial
court. The appellate court reversed on the ground that plaintiff was required to mitigate by ceasing to run the ad after defendant's repudiation, and went on to decide
whether "entity" or "components" valuation of the subtrahend was proper. Contrasting
its plaintiff-employee cases ("entity''), with its plaintiff-builder cases ("components''), it concluded that the instant case "more nearly resembles the former than it docs the latter
kind of contracts." 96 Mo. App. at 218. No issue of burden of proof was involved.
213 See I BoNBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 304 (1937); 5 CORBIN § 1100, at 449;
McCORMICK § 41; Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L.J. 443,
455 (1908); Waters, The Concept of Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REv. 360
(1958); Comment, 34 CAN. B. REv. 969 (1956); Note, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1937); Com-
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Where there in· fact has been a resale of the entity prior to
the trial,214 with attendant lost volume, the value of the lost volume
can be taken into account in either of two ways: (1) by adjusting
the value of the subtrahend to reflect it, or (2) by treating the
lost volume as an item of incidental damages. Where there has
been no such resale before trial, but damages are being computed
as if plaintiff had made such a resale, the value of the lost volume
should be taken into account as an adjustment of the subtrahend.
The subtrahend (actual resale value of the entity) should be reduced by the value to plaintiff of the lost volume. As will be
shown shortly, its value is the profit he would have made on such
an additional sale.
To take a simplified example, if plaintiff is a car retailer who
sells all his cars of a certain model at 3,000 dollars, and defendantcustomer repudiates his contract to purchase one, and resale would
be attended by lost volume, the minuend is the unpaid balance of
the price-3,000 dollars if defendant has paid nothing. The subtrahend is the resale value of the entity (3,000 dollars), reduced by
the profit plaintiff would have made on the lost sale-hypothetically 500 dollars. Deducting the adjusted subtrahend, 2,500 dollars,
from the minuend, 3,000 dollars, plaintiff should recover 500 dollars plus any incidental expenses. In this particular instance his
recovery is identical with the profit he would have enjoyed on
the contract with defendant had there been no breach, but, as
will be shown, this is not always the case.

D. J,Vhen Does Resale of the Entity "Cost" Plaintiff
the Sale of Another Similar Entity?
If the plaintiff resold or should have resold the entity once
promised to defendant and four conditions are met, the resale215
of that entity to that buyer has an invisible cost to plaintiff: loss
of the sale of other wares to that buyer.216 This will be true only
if: (I) the person who bought the resold entity217 would have been
ment, 65 YALE L.J. 992, 993 (1956); Annots., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952); 120 A.L.R. II92
(1939); 44 A.L.R. 349 (1926).
214 In the prior article, I discussed the lost volume problem in the context of valuing
"on hand" personalty, and made passing reference to its impact on "entity" valuation.
It arises only when the "entity" valuation is used, although in many such cases "entity"
and "components" approaches give identical results. It seems more easily handled by an
"entity" analysis.
215 "Resale" is used hereafter to include both a factual resale and the putative resale
used as a reference point when the entity's resale value fixes the subtrahend, although
in fact plaintiff failed to resell.
216 Cf. REsrATEMENT § 336, illustrations 6, 7.
217 If plaintiff in fact resold before trial a specified entity scheduled for defendant,
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solicited by plaintiff to buy other wares had there been no breach
and resale; (2) the solicitation would have been successful; (3)
the plaintiff could have performed that additional contract; and
(4) solely because he purchased the resold entity, that buyer now
is unwilling to buy other wares from plaintiff. Some amplification
is in order.
The notion that "the person who bought the resold entity
would have been solicited by plaintiff to buy other wares had
there been no breach and resale" can be broken down into two
aspects. One pertains to the likelihood that plaintiff would have
solicited someone to buy other wares at all. If plaintiff is not a
commercial seller, absent other evidence, he probably would not
have solicited anyone.218 If he is a commercial seller, absent other
facts, he probably would have attempted other sales. However,
even if plaintiff is a commercial seller, if he had decided to go
out of business prior to the time of receiving notice of defendant's
breach,219 he would not have solicited anyone to buy other wares.
Even if plaintiff is a commercial seller who had no plans to go
out of business, if prior to notice of breach he had reached the
limits of the volume he planned to sell,220 he would not have solicited further orders.
Plaintiff may have reached his limit of volume because he
could not handle more business without expansion of his plant
or drastic revision of his mode of doing business, neither of which
he intended to undertake. If at notice of breach plaintiff was handling as great a volume as he could accommodate without plant
expansion or drastic revision of his operations,221 the court should
this resale purchaser can be identified at the trial. Otherwise he is a putative person,
used as a reference point in valuation. In the latter event his "behavior" had he not
"bought" the "resold" entity can be known only through inferences drawn from the
original contract with defendant and the general nature of plaintiff's business. In the
former event evidence about his particular plans and wants should be admitted.
218 Unless there is affirmative evidence that plaintiff would have attempted other
sales, the plaintiff-seller who is not in the business of selling such wares as he contracted
to sell defendant should not get a lost volume adjustment.
219 See discussion of the Demirjian case in the text infra at 911-13.
220 Plaintiff's substantial expenditures on non-institutional advertising and promotion
at the time of receiving notice of breach is strong evidence that he had not reached the
limits of the volume that he planned to sell.
221 In several cases court and counsel appeared to ignore possible adjustment for lost
volume for this reason. E.g., Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich.
276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911) (plant filled to capacity by substitute contract); Tradesman Co.
v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 70~, 111 N.W. 343 ~1907) (limited supply of cover space
apparently already exhausted); Petne v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885) (sawmill
of limited capacity); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich. 239 (1872) (boat fully loaded). In some
cases, however, it was ignored although plaintiff's capacity was still expansible. E.g.,
Hopkins v. Sanford, 41 Mich. 243, 2 N.W. 39 (1879).
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presume that he did not intend to solicit another order. Of course,
the presumption should be rebuttable upon the introduction of
evidence that plaintiff in fact planned such expansion or revision.222
The other aspect of this first condition concerns the identity
of the person whose business plaintiff intended to solicit. If he
would not have solicited the person who purchased the resold
entity, the first condition is not met. For example, if plaintiff
resold the entity once headed for defendant in a market in which
plaintiff did not ordinarily operate,223 the probabilities are that
the resale purchaser, found in that market, was not someone whom
plaintiff otherwise would have solicited.224
The second condition is that the resale purchaser, had he been
solicited by plaintiff absent breach and resale, would have agreed
to purchase other wares from him. Normally,225 this is evidentially
supported by the fact that the purchaser took the resale entity
from plaintiff, suggesting that if he had not taken this entity from
plaintiff he would have taken another like one from him. The
evidence has probative value where the resold entity is in no
significant way different from the other wares plaintiff claims he
would have sold to the resale purchaser but for defendant's breach.
If the purchaser took one entity of fungibles, the odds are high
that he would have taken another entity of fungibles instead.
Once we depart from fungibles, however, the problem gets
harder. If the wares plaintiff claims he otherwise would have sold
this purchaser differ in some respect from the resold entity, the
question arises: had the resale purchaser been offered not the entity
rejected by defendant, but those other wares of plaintiff most similar to that entity, would he have bought these other wares from
See discussion of the Petrie case in the text infra at 911.
"Proof" problems become most difficult where defendant claims that the reduction in price which plaintiff gave the resale purchaser amounted to resale in such a
market, all other aspects of the sale being indistinguishable from plaintiff's ordinary
sales. Probably it is just a question of degree; a big reduction below the prices plaintiff
customarily gives arguably represents entry into another market.
224 If it appears that plaintiff resold the entity in an unusual market to avoid losing
volume by a resale in his usual market, the court should presume that this decision
accords with mitigation notions. However, defendant should be permitted to rebut the
presumption by showing that plaintiff (a) should have known resale in his regular market
would reduce damages further, even with adjustment for lost volume, and (b) resale in
his regular market would not have entailed more risk or self-sacrifice than the mitigation
notions require. Absent such rebuttal, the actual resale value of the entity in the
unusual market should fix the subtrahend, with no adjustment for lost volume.
221> Where the resale purchaser is identified at trial, this condition can be established
by other lines of proof. But the fact that the other wares of plaintiff all differ substantially from the resold entity should still be evidence that the condition was not met.
222

223
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plaintiff, refrained from any purchase of such wares, or purchased
from another seller wares which were more like the entity rejected
by defendant?
The car retailer situation furnishes an illustration. If defendant refused to accept a 1963 Chevrolet of a certain color and model,
and it was resold to X, and plaintiff is the only Chevrolet dealer
accessible to X, it is probable that plaintiff could have sold X
another 1963 Chevrolet of that model and color had X not bought
the car rejected by defendant. But if plaintiff could not have obtained another Chevrolet of that color and model, and another
Chevrolet dealer accessible to X could have done so, it is less likely
that X would have bought a different car from plaintiff had he not
bought the car rejected by defendant. Assuming for the moment
that price and other terms would be identical, and servicing would
be the same, it is more likely that X would have purchased his car
from the other Chevrolet dealer. Of course, if X is identified,
there may be other evidence offered to show that he would have
preferred to deal with plaintiff rather than another dealer even if
this meant buying a different model or color. But absent such
other evidence, there is no probability that this second condition
is met.
The third condition concerns plaintiff's ability to have performed such a contract with X, had it been made. If it is shown
that plaintiff lacked the physical ability to perform such a contract, no volume has been lost because of breach and resale that
would not have been lost even without breach and resale. 226
The last condition pertains to the limits on the resale purchaser's wants and financial means. If his purchase of the wares
that defendant rejected does not reduce X's desire or ability to
purchase other wares plaintiff wants to sell, plaintiff's volume has
not been impaired by the resale. For example, if defendant has
a standing offer to purchase all of a certain type of commodity
which plaintiff can acquire, resale of some of that commodity
to the resale purchaser does not prevent plaintiff from selling more
of it later to X. The purchaser's demands for more of it later are
undiminished by the resale of the entity defendant rejected. 227
In only two cases which have reached the Michigan Supreme
220 Often the non-fulfillment of this condition is the easiest way to defeat a lost
volume adjustment. E.g., Charter v. Sullivan, [1957] 2 Q.B. 117. See discussion of the
Petrie case infra at 911.
227 Similarly if X is a wealthy collector of items such as the resold entity, his resale
purchase may not reduce his interest in later purchases from plaintiff.
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Court have plaintiffs apparently argued for valuation of the subtrahend by an "entity" approach with adjustment to reflect the
lost volume attendant upon resale. In the second Petrie case228
plaintiff was a sawmill operator who contracted to cut defendant's
timber into boards. Defendant repudiated before performance
began. Plaintiff found other customers and kept the mill going
during the entire milling season doing their work. Plaintiff sought
to recover "lost profits," so his theory was either (a) that he should
be allowed a "components" approach, or (b) that he should be
allowed an "entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume.
The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant after plaintiff's
opening statement, and this was affirmed on appeal. On petition
for rehearing by the Michigan Supreme Court plaintiff argued, in
effect, that an "entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume
was appropriate, since resale of the entity (the mill's normal productive capacity for the season) deprived him of what otherwise
would have been his larger volume of his sales. He tried to counter the argument that he could not handle defendant's contract
as well as another by asserting that he could have operated his
mill day and night. The petition for rehearing was denied on
the ground that plaintiff failed to allege his ability to operate day
and night. 229 This would suggest that the court would not be
adverse to allowing an adjustment for lost volume in appropriate
cases, but that in this case plaintiff lacked the intent to sell any
other wares-the first condition. There may have been a feeling,
too, that he lacked the physical ability to operate the mill day
and night-the third condition.
In the Demirjian case230 plaintiff apparently oscillated between
a "components" approach and an "entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume, and it is most difficult to tell on which
theory the court affirmed plaintiff's trial court judgment. There
plaintiff was a commercial lessor of juke boxes who had agreed
to furnish defendant with a box for three years, to change the
records in it from time to time, and to keep it in repair. When
defendant repudiated the contract shortly after its commencement,
plaintiff repossessed the machine and sued for expectation damages. Shortly thereafter plaintiff went out of business, liquidating
this machine along with the rest of his enterprise. Apparently, in
Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887).
The court later properly retreated from this apparent endorsement of the resolution of such problems on the pleadings. See Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 322,
36 N.W. 88, 93 (1888).
2so Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958).
228
229
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the brief time between repossession and liquidation, he did not
arrange for another long-term lease of this machine, but put it
at some other location where his weekly receipts from it were less
than his costs of doing business.231
In the trial court plaintiff computed damages as if the mitigation notion required him to re-let the machine on identical terms
to those given defendant, and as if such re-letting deprived him
of still another lease of another machine.232 By the time plaintiff
filed his brief with the circuit court, however, he had modified his
theory. Now he was claiming, as well, that upon breach the mitigation notion permitted him to liquidate his business rather than
re-letting the machine for another three years. 233 His damage
measurement figures, with a single exception,234 were equally applicable to the new theory as well as to the old.235 The single
exception worked in defendant's favor. 236 The circuit court affirmed plaintiff's judgment without shedding much light on its
rationale.237 On further appeal to the supreme court plaintiff
Record, pp. 40(a)-4l(a).
Plaintiff's theory was that he should recover the contract price, $3,120, less the
following: depreciation over three years, cost of new records, cost of repair parts and
service, and interest on the purchase price of $165. He explained the last item thus:
"I estimated, that if the machine was taken out and could be placed somewhere else
that would save •.. the lessor from buying a new machine to put someplace else. The
new machine [would] cost eleven hundred dollars. Therefore, he would save the interest
on that . • .• Therefore, I knocked off an additional one-hundred-seventy-five dollars
for five per cent interest at three years." Record, pp. 38(a)-39(a). (The $175 figure was
later corrected to $165.)
His computation was co1Tect if "entity" valuation was being used with adjustment to
reflect lost volume, and if the unadjusted actual resale value of the entity was $3,120,
as he assumed. The minuend would be $3,120. The unadjusted subtrahend would be
the same. The adjustment would be the profit plaintiff would have made had he let
another juke box to X-the person to whom plaintiff should have re-let the box that
was repossessed. The lost profit on that "lost lease" of another machine would have
been $3,120 less the cost of items proved by plaintiff. The $165 item was properly included
as a variable cost that would have been incurred to perform that lost lease. Neither
counsel pressed the question of saved overhead after cross-examination of plaintiff showed
it to be of negligible size.
233 Record, p. 90(a).
234 The $165 item was inappropriate when plaintiff switched his theory. Under a
"components" approach the costs of another lease are irrelevant. And the interest charges
incurred before breach in order to perform for defendant are irrelevant, since not saved
because of the breach.
235 Under a "components" approach plaintiff saved (1) three years' use of the machine,
which is reflected in the earlier "depreciation" item; (2) the "yet to be acquired" nonoverhead items involving record replacement and repairs-all reflected in the figures in
the record.
236 Plaintiff magnanimously waived the $165 item when he switched theories. He
did not mention the fact that he was switching, in either his circuit court or supreme
court brief.
237 "Plaintiff • • • is suing for his expectation interest, the profit he would have
enjoyed had not defendant breached the contract. To determine this amount it is
231
232
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again straddled both theories-"components" valuation and "entity" valuation with adjustment for lost volume.238 His victory
produced no further judicial illumination; the supreme court
affirmed on the opinion below without additional comments.
While the case can be read as a judicial endorsement of the
"entity" approach with adjustment for lost volume, it seems better
to read it as but another example of the "components" approach.
Mitigation notions permitted plaintiff to stop further work toward
resale (re-letting) of the entity, and he never did resell the entity;
thus a "components" approach is in order. An "entity" approach
with adjustment for lost volume would seem inappropriate inasmuch as plaintiff went out of business shortly after breach, suggesting that even without the breach he would not have been
trying to arrange for additional leases. (There was nothing in
the record to indicate that plaintiff's decision to go out of business could be attributed to defendant's breach.)
In Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey2 39 plaintiff did not argue that
entity resale would impair his total volume, but did seek to measure damages in a fashion that would be justifiable only according
to such a theory. The rationale he presented for his measure,
however, was clearly fallacious. 240 The court reversed the plaintiff's judgment, in effect valuing the subtrahend by the actual
resale value of the entity without adjustment for the value of the
lost volume. Since neither counsel nor the court considered the
possibilities of volume being impaired,241 the case would not seem
necessary to subtract plaintiff's expenses from the consideration he would have received
from defendant." 353 Mich. at 622, 91 N.W.2d at 843.
238 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 10, 15. Plaintiff did not view his second theory
as "entity valuation with adjustment for lost volume." Rather, he saw it as involving a
rule of this sort: where plaintiff has sufficient space and personnel to handle, at once,
his contract with defendant and another similar contract made by plaintiff with X after
defendant's breach, plaintiff's recovery against defendant should not be reduced by the
profits plaintiff made on his contract with X, because these profits were not caused by
defendant's breach. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 11.
2so 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904).
240 Plaintiff argued: (1) the measure is the difference between contract price and
market price; (2) the only evidence of market price was his testimony about the wholesale market in which he had purchased the goods; and (3) therefore, the subtrahend should
be the wholesale price of the goods. The fallacy lies in the facts that (a) the formula
means resale market (actual resale value), not the market in which plaintiff purchased
(cost value), and (b) since plaintiff has the burden of proving actual resale value, his
failure to prove the right market results in his defeat, not the substitution of the value
be proved in the wrong market. The court so held.
Since he was a list-price seller it was possible to infer the actual resale value of the
goods: it would be identical to the contract price. Plaintiff did not want to stress this
because, unless an adjustment for lost volume was possible, it would lead to identical
minuend and subtrahend and no recovery. The court so held.
241 Defendant and the court distinguished cases in which the plaintiff-seller recov-
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to indicate that the court would reject such an argument were it
put forward.242

E. "Components" Approach Compared With "Entity" Approach
With Adjustment for Lost Volume
Counsel and the court often refer to the "components" approach by describing it as a formula which permits plaintiff-seller
to recover his "lost profits." This is dangerous terminology. In
some situations, however, "components" valuation of the subtrahend gives plaintiff his "mark-up profit," and this fact apparently
gave rise to the terminology. If breach occurs before plaintiff has
received any payment from defendant, and before plaintiff has
delivered any performance to defendant, and before plaintiff has
"on hand" any non-overhead components of performance, all the
components saved are valued at cost. Indeed, the subtrahend is
identical to a list of the total costs of contract performance, and
the minuend is identical to the contract price. The recovery is
contract price less total costs, plus incidental damages, if any. It
is only natural to regard such a formula as giving plaintiff his
"lost profit"-the difference between the contract price and what
it would have cost him to perform that contract with defendant.243
When breach occurs after plaintiff has accomplished part of
his performance, if he still has no non-overhead components on
hand and has received nothing from defendants, it is possible to
view the formula as one involving recovery of two items: "lost
profit" plus "costs incurred." 244 Even if plaintiff has both delivered
ered "lost profits" under a "components" approach. Such an approach was deemed
inapplicable here both because plaintiff had in fact resold the entity and because the
mitigation notion required him to do so. Neither defendant nor the court considered
the possibility of lost volume adjustment, and there is no suggestion of it in plaintiff's
brief.
242 In several Michigan cases plaintiff has been a correspondence school and defend•
ant the disheartened self-educator who broke his contract. The plaintiff invariably
sought, and failed to get, a price recovery. E.g., \\Talton School of Commerce v. Stroud,
248 Mich. 85, 226 N.W. 883 (1929); International Text-Book Co. v. Marvin, 166 Mich.
660, 132 N.W. 437 (1911); International Text-Book Co. v. Jones, 166 Mich. 86, 131 N.W.
98 (1911); International Textbook Co. v. Schulte, 151 Mich. 149, 114 N.W. 1031 (1908).
The court, while unwilling tg allow a price recovery (which would value the subtrahend
at zero), nevertheless indicated that the proper measure of damages would be "the
difference between the contract price of the course and what it would cost plaintiff
to give it." Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, supra at 89, 226 N.W. at 885. This
apparently would be an example of valuing the subtrahend as an entity and then adjusting for lost volume, although the rationale is not elaborated by the court. Perhaps
the court really had in mind the "components" approach. See also Annot., 78 A.L.R.
334 (1932).
243 See Walton School of Commerce v. Stroud, supra note 242; Fell v. Newberry, 106
Mich. 542, 64 N.W. 474 (1895); Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888).
244 See Moline Furniture Works v. Club Holding Co., 280 Mich. 587, 274 N.W. 338
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some performance and received some payment, the "lost profit"
formulation can be retained by viewing the recovery as consisting
now of three items: ("lost profit" plus "costs incurred") minus
such part of the price as has been paid. 245 And even if plaintiff
has delivered some performance, received some of defendant's performance and has some finished goods on hand but undelivered,
the flavor can be retained by seeing in the formula four elements:
("lost profit" plus "costs incurred") minus ("such part of the price
as has been paid" plus "the market [actual resale] value of the
finished goods on hand"). 246
But this effort to retain the "lost profit" notion at all intellectual costs involves unnecessary steps in computation,247 and
obscures the justification for this measure of damages.248 Moreover, it invites the judges to treat the "lost profit" involved in
such suits as they treat "lost profits" in other types of casesrequiring that the "lost profits" be proved with certainty and be
foreseeable to defendant at the time of contract as potential items
of loss in the event of his breach.249 The fact that the "lost profit"
involved in this components-valued plaintiff-seller suit is markedly
different from the "lost profits" involved in those other suits is
thereby obscured.250
This familiar habit of viewing the components-valued plaintiff-seller recovery as one involving recapture of lost profits breeds
further confusion in regard to suits in which the plaintiff-seller
seeks to use "entity" valuation with adjustment for lost volume.
In the latter kind of case plaintiff's recovery can also be regarded
as one involving "lost profits."251
(1937); Davey v. Sanders, 253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); Loud v. Campbell, 26 Mich.
239 (1872).
245 See Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896);
Atkinson v. Morse, 63 Mich. 276, 29 N.W. 711 (1886); Goodrich v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 62,
16 N.W. 232 (1883).
246 Ibid.
247 See text at note 33 supra.
248 The "components" approach is not justified merely because plaintiffs in certain
trades have a peculiar view of their enterprise [See Patterson, Builder's Measure of
Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31 CoLU!lf. L. REv. 1286, 1293-94 (1931), attempting to
explain why the builder gets lost profits.], nor because for reasons mysterious the spirit
of the common law treats certain occupations as peculiar [see note 212 supra], but because
mitigation notions required or permitted plaintiff to refrain from attempting to complete and resell the entity still undelivered to defendant.
240 See text supra at 866.
2uO The distinction was first. recognized in the Fell case in 1895. See text at
note 81 supra. But this did not forestall the habit of calling the "components" approach
a "lost profit" recove~. See, e.g., Davey v. San~ers, 253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931);
Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, 110 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896); Hitchcock v.
Knights of Maccabees, 100 Mich. 40, 58 N.W. 640 (1894).
2:;1 In such a suit the term is appropriate. But it should be kept clear that the
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The notion that there can be two different rationales for
plaintiff-seller's "lost profit" recovery, each applicable to different,
but overlapping, sets of fact situations,252 has not reached the court.
In Mohr Hardware,253 the court seems to have assumed that "lost
profits" can be recovered by a plaintiff-seller only when the "components" approach is justified. The same assumption, with less
disastrous consequences, was manifest in the two cases in which
the court reversed "lost profit" recoveries because defendant had
not been permitted to show a post-breach resale of the entity.2154
While in neither case does the record suggest that volume was
lost by the resale, the possibility should not have been foreclosed.
Another aspect of the confusion seems to be a somewhat fatalistic acceptance of the inscrutable ways of the plaintiff-seller's
"lost profit" recovery. At times court and counsel seem to regard
it as a peculiarity not susceptible to rational analysis.255 Athol Mfg.
Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp.,256 discussed earlier,257 may well have
blundered along its bizarre route because no one felt sure he could
tell just when "lost profits" should be recovered. The Leonard
case,258 involving the single sawmill operator who succeeded in
getting lost profits during Justice Cooley's sawmill reign of terror,
seems to have thrived on similar confusion. There plaintiff was
once again faced with repudiation before he started to perform,
and once again the saved entity was the productive capacity of the
mill for the season. But this plaintiff had attempted to resell the
entity and had met with moderate success. Part of the productive
capacity of the mill was resold (at low rates) although the remainder could not be sold.
"lost profit" is not the one plaintiff would have made on his contract with defendant,
but on the lost contract he would otherwise have made with the resale purchaser but
for resale to him.
252 In some situations plaintiff is entitled to "lost profits" on both rationales; because
mitigation notions permit him to stop work toward completion of the entity, and be•
cause resale of the entity would entail lost volume. The court has on occasion reached
the correct result in such cases, but saw only the single reason-that mitigation
notions permitted plaintiff to refuse to finish and resell the entity ("components" ap•
proach). E.g., Nurmi v. Beardsley, 284 Mich. 165, 278 N.W. 805 (1938); Davey v. Sanders,
253 Mich. 137, 234 N.W. 128 (1931); Scheible v. Klein, 89 Mich. 376, 50 N.W. 857 (1891).
253 Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W. 127 (1904).
254 See Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559
(1911); Petrie v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885).
255 The court's reluctance to explain the distinction between entity-valued and com•
ponents-valued cases is striking. See also the discussion of Tradesman in the text supra
at 904-905, and the judicial opinions in Demirjian at note 230 supra.
256 222 Mich. 95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923).
257 See text supra at 894-98.
2158 Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88 (1888).
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Plaintiff pleaded these facts and repeated them in his opening
statement, concluding with a prayer for recovery of lost profits.
The prayer appears strange since neither a "components" approach2110 nor an "entity" approach with lost volume adjustment260
would seem appropriate. Conceivably plaintiff could justify the
prayer on the ground that a "components" approach should be
used although he attempted to resell the entity because "entity"
valuation of the subtrahend would give him even larger recovery.
In any event, the trial judge directed a verdict for defendant
at that point, influenced by the prior sawmill operator case261 to
the effect that these mill operators as a class can never recover lost
profits. When the instant case reached the supreme court on appeal, the retreat from the no-sawmiller-lost-profi.ts-nohow position
was beginning,262 and the court reversed the verdict directed on
that theory. Had it stopped there, things would have been well.
But the court remanded to permit plaintiff to prove his lost
profits with certainty, if he could, thereby endorsing plaintiff's
version of the measure of damages. In the later struggle over sawmiller's recovery of lost profits the case became the plaintiff's
standby, 263 illustrating just when such lost profits can be recovered.
The probable explanation of the .case is that the court spent its
attention on the decision to repudiate the flat ban on sawmill
operator's lost profits and spent little or no thought on whether
the facts of this case justified this sawmill operator in such a measure even if the ban were repealed. Defendant never argued for
an "entity" valuation, being preoccupied in the effort to maintain his directed verdict.
The pattern that seems to emerge from these cases neither
supports nor vitiates my views. In no case where counsel has made
appropriate arguments has the court nonetheless ignored them to
reach an erroneous result. On the other hand, in several cases
where counsel have failed to make appropriate arguments, the
court has failed to find them. 264 This is true even in those cases
250 Having attempted to resell the entity he should be permitted to use "entity"
valuation unless defendant shows he should not have made the attempt. See text supra
at 900-01. Indeed, if defendant preferred "entity" valuation it should be used. Ibid. The
trial judge ended the case before defendant took a position on this.
260 Plaintiff could not handle more contracts without plant expansion and apparently
planned none.
·
261 Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428, 12 N.W. 640 (1882).
262 See text at note 79 supra.
263 Barrett v. Grand Rapids Veneer Works, ll0 Mich. 6, 67 N.W. 976 (1896); Fell·
v. Newberry, 106 Mich. 542, 64 N.W. 474 (1895).
·
264 From the writer's point of view, Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., 222 Mich.
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where the court was remanding for trial, and where its remarks
might have prevented confusion on remand.265
The Michigan legal development, judicial and statutory,266
never comes to grips267 with two major distinctions: (1) the choice
between "entity" and "components" approaches; and (2) the choice
between ordinary entity valuation and entity valuation with an
adjustment for lost volume. And neither court nor counsel work
sure-footedly in this area when guided by instinct alone.
F. Valuing the Lost Volume
The value of the lost volume is the difference between the
gross receipts lost and the costs saved when plaintiff was deprived
of the additional sale.
Normally the quantity of volume lost is identical to the quantity of the entity resold. But if plaintiff lacked the intent or ability
to make another sale of that much additional volume, and still
had such intent and ability as to some lesser volume, that lesser
volume fixes the quantity term. For example, if plaintiff's factory
can handle contracts for 40,000 units simultaneously, and defendant's contract was for 15,000 units, and repudiation came while
the factory had total orders (including defendant's) for 30,000
units, the lost volume is 10,000 units.
In proving the lost gross receipts it is necessary to show the
price of the lost sale. This demonstration is simple if plaintiff always sells on identical terms to those defendant accepted. It was
in such a list price context that many courts first recognized the
lost volume phenomenon.268 But even if plaintiff's price term is
not fixed, it should be possible to meet the "certainty" test as to the
lost gross receipts if plaintiff can show the past range of his prices
95, 192 N.W. 668 (1923), and Mohr Hardware Co. v. Dubey, 136 Mich. 677, 100 N.W.
127 (1904), were wrongly decided. And Leonard v. Beaudry, 68 Mich. 312, 36 N.W. 88
(1888), Harrington-Wiard Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., 166 Mich. 276, 131 N.W. 559 (1911),
and Petrie v. Lane, 58 Mich. 527, 25 N.W. 504 (1885), may have been erroneous, although
the facts are scanty. In none of them was the proper argument made by counsel.
265 E.g., Athol Mfg. Co. v. Briscoe Motor Corp., supra note 264; Harrington-Wiard
Co. v. Blomstrom Mfg. Co., supra note 264; Leonard v. Beaudry, supra note 264; Petrie
v. Lane, supra note 264.
266 See discussion of UNIFORM SALES Ar:::r § 64(4) [MxcH. CoMP. LAws § 440.64(4) (1948)]
at note 181 supra.
267 See note 168 supra.
268 E.g., Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 Atl. 760 (1916); Stewart v. Hansen,
62 Utah 281,218 Pac. 959 (1923); Thompson v. Robinson, [1955] 1 Ch. 177. See Comment,
65 YALE L.J. 992 (1956); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1008 (1952). Comment 2 to UNIFORM COM•
MERCIAL Com~ § 2-708 stresses "fixed price articles" and "standard priced goods" as
appropriate for "lost profit" treatment under § 2-708(2).
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and is willing to fix the gross receipts at the bottom of that range. 269
Proof of saved variable costs varies somewhat from the treatment of non-overhead items under a "components" approach.
There a distinction was drawn between "on hand" and "yet to
be acquired" items. This was feasible because the particular contract, wholly or partially unperformed by plaintiff, could be identified with precision: it was the contract with defendant. In
computing the value of saved volume the unperformed contract
normally cannot be identified with precision, so it is not possible
to show whether it would have been performed with "on hand"
or "yet to be acquired" non-overhead components.
The court should presume that it would have been performed
with "yet to be acquired" non-overhead items, and should value all
such items at cost. This will value them accurately if, as is usually
the case, the reduction in plaintiff's volume of sales causes him
to reduce proportionately the volume of non-overhead items he
acquires from his suppliers. In the one case in which the Michigan
Supreme Court may have approved a lost volume adjustment, its
value was established in this fashion. 270
Valuing the saved overhead costs of the lost volume presents
the same problems seen earlier when saved overhead was discussed as one category of a "components" approach. No Michigan
case has raised this problem. The only Michigan case dealing with
the burden of proving various aspects of the lost volume held that
plaintiff has the burden of showing that he could have had another contract in addition to those he had at the time of breach.271
This accords with the views presented in my prior article concen1ing burden of proving lost volume.272 In view of the dearth of
Michigan decisions, further discussion of the burden of proof
problems seems needless.
V.

CONCLUSION

No Michigan case in which counsel presented appropriate
arguments to the court reached a result inconsistent with the
260 Cf. Moon Motor Car Co. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1928);
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Egerton, 288 Fed. 698 (4th Cir. 1923); Dolly Parker Motors,
Inc. v. Stinson, 220 Ark. 28, 245 S.W.2d 820 (1952). See also Waters, The Concept of
Market in the Sale of Goods, 36 CAN. B. REv. 360 (1958).
270 Demirjian v. Kurtis, 353 Mich. 619, 91 N.W.2d 841 (1958). See text supra at 911-13.
271 Petric v. Lane, 67 Mich. 454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887).
272 See Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's Damages for Total Breach
of Contract, 60 MICH. L. REv. 577, 601 (1962).
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views set forth here. In Athol273 and Mohr Hardware results different from those which the writer would endorse were reached,
but in both instances counsel failed to make proper arguments.
In Leonard and the second Petrie case274 the results may have
been discrepant (it being hard to tell since both cases were decided on the pleadings and opening statements), but again counsel
failed to present their views properly. In Tradesman the result
was proper, but the dictum was either discrepant or deceiving.
The court's treatment of the various categories of components
in cases where that approach is used, and its treatment of the
entity in cases where the "entity" approach is identical to the
"components" approach, correlates perfectly with my views, and
suggests that the court's analysis is quite similar. But when a
choice arises between "entity" and "components" approaches, or
when the court must handle an "entity" approach in a case where
the "entity" and "components" approaches differ, the court does
not seem to be travelling the same route as that indicated here.
And when the problem of lost volume arises, the court seems quite
unaware of the concepts here described. Perhaps the court is
struggling for some such concepts, but it would not be fair to
say that my views are merely an articulation of the court's tacit
notions in such cases.
While this article was designed to test my hypothesis against
the Michigan experience, I cannot resist adding a suggestion for
the future. Michigan has recently made pre-trial mandatory in
all civil actions.275 It would appear from the cases where counsel
has failed to carry the burden on some subtrahend item because
he was unaware until too late that he had the burden, that pretrial discussion of the contract damage issues would be time well
spent even if it did no more than apprise counsel of the perils
ahead. And if on occasion stipulations were forthcoming about
such matters as whether "components" or "entity" valuation was
to be used, the time spent at pre-trial would save much more time
at the actual trial. Where complex issues of contract damages are
tried to a jury the possibilities of confusion are grave enough in
the best of circumstances; if pre-trial can simplify some of these
issues it would' p~y dividends in improved justice.
273 See text supra at 894-98.
274 Petrie v. Lane, 67 Mich.
275 MICH. CT. R. 35.
.

454, 35 N.W. 70 (1887).

